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A Procurement Auction for Toxic Assets with Asymmetric Information

Author

Listed:
  • Olivier Armantier
  • Charles A. Holt
  • Charles R. Plott

Abstract

The proposed 2008 TARP auction was intended to remove "toxic" assets from portfolios of financially stressed banks. The Treasury selected a design whereby bids to sell different securities would be normalized by "reference prices" that reflect relative value estimates. We conduct a series of experiments indicating that a simple Reference Price Auction can be an effective mechanism for avoiding serious effects of adverse selection and strategic bid manipulation, even with inaccurate reference prices. Beyond the TARP auction, our results are relevant to various multi-object auctions with value heterogeneity.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Armantier & Charles A. Holt & Charles R. Plott, 2013. "A Procurement Auction for Toxic Assets with Asymmetric Information," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 142-162, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:5:y:2013:i:4:p:142-62
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.5.4.142
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Holt, Charles A. & Shobe, William M., 2016. "Reprint of: Price and quantity collars for stabilizing emission allowance prices: Laboratory experiments on the EU ETS market stability reserve," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 69-86.
    2. Matthias Weber & John Duffy & Arthur Schram, 2019. "Credit Default Swap Regulation in Experimental Bond Markets," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 19-039/I, Tinbergen Institute.
    3. Cramton, Peter & Hellerstein, Daniel & Higgins, Nathaniel & Iovanna, Richard & López-Vargas, Kristian & Wallander, Steven, 2021. "Improving the cost-effectiveness of the Conservation Reserve Program: A laboratory study," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
    4. Banerjee, Simanti & Conte, Marc N., 2017. "Balancing Complexity and Rent-Seeking in Multi-Attribute Conservation Procurement Auctions: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment," 2018 Allied Social Sciences Association (ASSA) Annual Meeting, January 5-7, 2018, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 266293, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    5. Füllbrunn, Sascha & Neugebauer, Tibor, 2022. "Testing market regulations in experimental asset markets – The case of margin purchases," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 200(C), pages 1160-1183.
    6. Noussair, Charles N. & Seres, Gyula, 2020. "The effect of collusion on efficiency in experimental auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 267-287.
    7. Giese, Julia & Grace, Charlotte, 2023. "An evaluation of the Bank of England’s ILTR operations: comparing the product-mix auction to alternatives," Bank of England working papers 1044, Bank of England.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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    1. A Procurement Auction for Toxic Assets with Asymmetric Information (AEJ:MI 2013) in ReplicationWiki

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