This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

The Winner's Curse: Experiments with Buyers and with Sellers

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Lind, Barry
Plott, Charles R
Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28199103%2981%3A1%3C335%3ATWCEWB%3E2.0.CO%3B2-5&origin=repec
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 81 (1991)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 335-46
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:81:y:1991:i:1:p:335-46

Contact details of provider:
Email:
Web page: http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.aeaweb.org/subscribe.html

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Blecherman, Barry, 1996. "Is There a Winner's Curse In The Market For Baseball Players? Evidence From The Field," Working Papers 966, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  2. Li, Jin & Plott, Charles R., 2005. "Tacit collusion in auctions and conditions for its facilitation and prevention: Equilibrium selection in laboratory experimental markets," Working Papers 1223, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  3. Marco Casari & John C. Ham & John H. Kagel, 2005. "Selection bias, demographic effects, and ability effects in common value auction experiments," Staff Reports 213, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Vincent P. Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2005. "Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000604, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Boeheim, Rene & Zulehner, Christine, 1996. "Auctions - A Survey," Economics Series 39, Institute for Advanced Studies. [Downloadable!]
  6. Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2000. "Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study," Virginia Economics Online Papers 347, University of Virginia, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Plott, Charles R. & Chen, Kay-Yut, 2002. "Information Aggregation Mechanisms: Concept, Design and Implementation for a Sales Forecasting Problem," Working Papers 1131, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  8. James Cox & Sam Dinkin & James Swarthout, 2001. "Endogenous Entry and Exit in Common Value Auctions," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 163-181, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Asen Ivanov & Dan Levin & Muriel Niederle, 2008. "Can Relaxation of Beliefs Rationalize the Winner’s Curse?: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 0803, VCU School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. John D Hey & Andrea Morone & Ulrich Schmidt, 2007. "Noise and Bias in Eliciting Preferences," Discussion Papers 07/04, Department of Economics, University of York. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS also indexes software components.

This page was last updated on 2009-10-31.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.