Washington St. Louis - School of Business and Political Economy

For technical questions regarding this series, please contact (Thomas Krichel)
Series handle: repec:fth:waslbp

• 9905 Parimutuel Lotteries: Gambler's Behavior and the Demand for Tickets
  by Hauser, U. & Konig, U,
• 9904 Corporate Vote-Trading as an Instrument of Corporate Governance
  by Neeman, Z. & Orosel, G.O.
• 9902 Incomplete Markets and the Firm
  by Dierker, E. & Dierker, H. & Grodal, B.
• 9901 Powerful Wives and Faithful Husbands
  by Maderner, N.

• 9808 An Evolutionary Analysis of Insurance Markets Under Adverse Selection
  by Ania, A.B. & Troger, T. & Wambach, A.
• 9807 Individual Randomness in Economic Models with a Continuum Agents
  by Alos-Ferrer, C.
• 9805 Optimal Incentives to Reduce Downstream Pollution Under Asymmetric Information
  by Kerschbamer, R. & Maderner, N.
• 9804 Product Differentiation and Market Power
  by Dierker, E. & Dierker, H.
• 9803 Dividends and Agency Costs
  by Gugler, K.
• 9801 Dynamic Systems with a Continuum of Randomly Matched Agents
  by Alos-Ferrer, C.

• 168 Product Cost Disclosure and Renegotiation Costs in Profit Center and Market Exchanges: An Empirical Test
  by Poppo, L.
• 167 Pharmaceutical Expenditure and Regulatory Policy in the NHS
  by Olson, M.
• 165 Centralization of Policymaking in the National Park Service
  by Lowry, W.R.
• 164 Political Competition in Multiparty Coalition Governments
  by Schofield, N.
• 163 Probability and Convergence for Supramajority rule with Euclidean Preferences
  by Schofield, N. & Tovey, C.A.
• 162 A Theory of Coalition Government in a Spatial Model of Voting
  by Schofield, N.
• 161 The Almost Surely Shrinking Yolk
  by Tovey, C.A.

• 166 The Role of Private Information in the Sunk Cost Phenomenon
  by Berg, J. & Dickhaut, J.W. & Kanodia, C.
• 159 Information Pooling Through Majority-Rule Voting: Condorcet's Jury Theorem with Correlated Votes
  by Ladha, K.K.
• 158 Political Discourse, Factions, and the General Will: Correlated Voting and Condorcet's Jury Theorem
  by Ladha, K.K. & Miller, G.
• 157 Condorcet's Jury Theorem in Light of de Finetti's Theorem: Majority-Rule Voting with Correlated Votes
  by Ladha, K.K.
• 156 Institutionally-Derived Stability: Cores in Two- Dimensional Voting Games
  by Eavy, C.L. & Miller, G.J.
• 155 The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech and Correlated Votes
  by Ladha, K.K.
• 154 Early Republican Retirement: A Cause of Democratic Dominance in the House of Representatives
  by Gilmour, J.B. & Rothstein, P.
• 153 Abnormal Politics: Possibilities for Presidential Leadership
  by Miller, G.J.
• 152 The Dynamics of a Stable Cartel: The Express 1851-1913
  by Grossman,P.Z.
• 148 Why Do Employers Only Reward Extreme Performance? Evidence And Expalnations Of Zig-Zagging Relationships Among Performance, Pay,And Turnover
  by Zenger, T.R.

• 147 The Pivotal Role of the Judiciary in the Deregulation Battle Between the Executive and Legislature
  by Ladha, K.K.
• 146 The Political Economy of Changing Property Rights: Dismantling a Kenyan Commons
  by Ensminger, J. & Rutten, A.
• 145 Understanding Organizational Diseconomies of Scale: Small Firm Advantages in Resolving Agency Problems in R&D
  by Zenger, T.R.
• 144 A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics
  by North, D.C.
• 143 Agency Problems And Structural Arrangements Within International Economic Organizations: The Case Of The World Bank
  by Gauthier, B.
• 142 Revisionist Tarriff History And The Theory Of Hegemonic Stability
  by Nye, J.V.
• 141 Negligence Versus Strict Liability Regimes In Auditing: An Experimental Investigation
  by Dopuch, N. & King, R.R.
• 140 The Tragicomedy Of The Commons: Why Communities Rationally Choose "Infficient" Allocations Os Shared Resources
  by Roberts, R.D.
• 139 Factor Proportions, Public Finances, And Property Rights On Labor Resources: A Test And Reformulation Of Domar'S Hypothesis On Slavery Or Serfdom
  by Pastore, M.H.
• 138 Hierarchies And Delegation: Sequential Production And Process In An Organizational Setting
  by Gauthier, B.

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This page was last updated on 2009-10-24.