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Why doesn't Capitalism flow to Poor Countries?

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Author Info
Rafael Di Tella (Harvard Business School)
Robert MacCulloch (Princeton University)

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Abstract

We find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that governments in poor countries have a more left wing rhetoric than those in OECD countries. A possible explanation is that corruption, which is more widespread in poor countries, reduces the electoral appeal of capitalism more than that of socialism. The empirical pattern of beliefs within countries is consistent with this explanation: people who perceive corruption to be high in the country are also more likely to lean left ideologically and to declare to support a more intrusive government in economic matters. Finally, we show that the corruption-left connection can be explained if corruption is seen as unfair behavior on the part of capitalists. Voters then react by moving left, even if this is materially costly to them. There is a negative ideological externality since the existence of corrupt entrepreneurs hurts good entrepreneurs by reducing the general appeal of capitalism.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Others with number 0404005.

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Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: 12 Apr 2004
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpot:0404005

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 42
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Related research
Keywords: beliefs; corruption; fairness; legitimacy; ideological externality.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Eduardo Lora & Mauricio Olivera, 2005. "Repercusiones electorales del Consenso de Washington," RES Working Papers 4406, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  2. Ugo Panizza & Mónica Yañez, 2005. "Why are Latin Americans so unhappy about reforms?," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 0, pages 1-29, May. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Alberto Alesina & George-Marios Angeletos, 2005. "Corruption, Inequality and Fairness," NBER Working Papers 11399, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Eduardo Lora & Mauricio Olivera, 2005. "The Electoral Consequences of the Washington Consensus," RES Working Papers 4405, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  5. Gustavo Federico Torrens, 2008. "The economic value of ideology," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 378, Universidad del CEMA. [Downloadable!]
  6. Di Tella, Rafael & Dubra, Juan, 2006. "Crime and Punishment in the "American Dream"," MPRA Paper 500, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Rafael Di Tella & Juan Dubra & Robert MacCulloch, 2008. "A Resource Belief-Curse? Oil and Individualism," NBER Working Papers 14556, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Rafael Di Tella & Sebastian Galiani & Ernesto Schargrodsky, 2008. "Reality versus Propaganda in the Formation of Beliefs about Privatization," NBER Working Papers 14483, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Alberto Chong & Mark Gradstein, 2008. "¿A quién le hacen falta líderes autoritarios?," RES Working Papers 4564, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  10. Chong, Alberto & Gradstein, Mark, 2006. "Imposed Institutions and Preferences for Redistribution," CEPR Discussion Papers 5922, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Rafael Di Tella & Robert MacCulloch, 2007. "Happiness, Contentment and Other Emotions for Central Banks," NBER Working Papers 13622, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Alberto Chong & Mark Gradstein, 2008. "Who Needs Strong Leaders?," RES Working Papers 4563, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  13. Alberto Chong & Mark Gradstein, 2006. "Redistributional Preferences and Imposed Institutions," RES Working Papers 4482, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
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