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Learning to Like What You Have - Explaining the Endowment Effect

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Author Info
Steffen Huck (Humboldt University, Berlin)
Georg Kirchsteiger (CentER, Tilburg)
Joerg Oechssler (Humboldt University, Berlin)

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Abstract

The endowment effect describes the fact that people demand much more to give up an object than they are willing to spend to acquire it. The existence of this effect has been documented in numerous experiments. We attempt to explain this effect by showing that evolution favors individuals whose preferences embody an endowment effect. The reason is that an endowment effect improves one's bargaining position in bilateral trades. We show that for a general class of evolutionary processes almost all individuals will have a strictly positive and finite endowment effect.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9702001.

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Date of creation: 06 Feb 1997
Date of revision: 15 May 1997
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9702001

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

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  2. Ellingsen, Tore, 1997. "The Evolution of Bargaining Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(2), pages 581-602, May.
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  5. Young H. P., 1993. "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 145-168, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. R. Cressman, K.H. Schlag, 1995. "The Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction," Discussion Paper Serie B 347, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Huck, Steffen & Oechssler, Jorg, 1999. "The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 13-24, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Steven F. Venti & David A. Wise, 1990. "But They Don't Want to Reduce Housing Equity," NBER Working Papers 2859, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Hanemann, W Michael, 1991. "Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept: How Much Can They Differ?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 635-47, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Iris Bohnet & Bruno S. Frey & Steffen Huck, . "More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding," IEW - Working Papers iewwp052, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. William H. Sandholm, 2001. "Preference Evolution, Two-Speed Dynamics, and Rapid Social Change," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 4(3), pages 637-679, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Thomas Norman, 2004. "Dynamically Stable Preferences," Economics Series Working Papers 207, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Biel, Anders & Johansson-Stenman, Olof & Nilsson, Andreas, 2006. "Emotions, Morality and Public Goods: The WTA-WTP Disparity Revisited," Working Papers in Economics 193, Göteborg University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Schunk, Daniel, 2005. "Search behaviour with reference point preferences:," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 05-12, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
  5. Munro, Alistair & Ferreira De Sousa, Yannick, 2008. "Truck, barter and exchange versus the endowment effect: virtual field experiments in an online game environment," MPRA Paper 8977, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  6. Peter R. Mueser & Jay K. Dow, 1998. "Experimental Evidence on the Divergence Between Measures of Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept--The Role of Value Uncertainty," Experimental 9803001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  7. Werner Güth & Loreto Llorente Erviti & Anthony Ziegelmeyer, 2006. "Asymmetric Information without Common Priors: An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis of Quantity Competition," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-37, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  8. Aviad Heifetz & Yossi Spiegel, 2000. "On the Evolutionary Emergence of Optimism," Discussion Papers 1304, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  9. Riedl, A. & Vyrastekova, J., 2002. "Social preference in three-player ultimatum game experiments," Discussion Paper 5, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  10. Florian Englmaier & Arno Schmöller, 2008. "Reserve Price Formation in Online Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  11. Burkhard C. Schipper, 2005. "The Evolutionary Stability of Optimism, Pessimism and Complete Ignorance," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse35_2005, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Joerg Oechssler & Frank Riedel, 1998. "Evolutionary Dynamics on Infinite Strategy Spaces," Game Theory and Information 9805002, EconWPA, revised 12 May 1998. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Plott, Charles & Zeiler, Kathryn, 2005. "Asymmetries in exchange behavior incorrectly interpreted as evidence of prospect theory," Working Papers 1230, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  14. Heifetz, Aviad & Spiegel, Yossi, 2000. "On the Evolutionary Emergency of Optimism," Working Papers 1104, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  15. repec:att:wimass:19199828 is not listed on IDEAS
  16. Jose Apesteguia & Miguel Ballester, 2009. "A theory of reference-dependent behavior," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 427-455, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  17. Steffen Huck & Joerg Oechssler, 1995. "The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations," Game Theory and Information 9507001, EconWPA, revised 27 Aug 1998. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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