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The Excess Power Puzzle of the EU Budget

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Author Info
Heikki Kauppi (Department of Economics, University of Turku)
Mika Widgrén (Department of Economics, Turku School of Economics)

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Abstract

It is a constant topic of debate how the European Union (EU) spends the money it collects from its member states. This paper supports the idea that the EU budget battle involves one-shot games that have persistent impacts on the budget allocations. In one way or the other, the member states are able to establish rules or contracts that restrict the budget allocation in advance. In the current status quo, France and Spain are the clearest winners of these restrictions, while Austria, Finland and Sweden, not to mention the new member states, suffer largest losses.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Aboa Centre for Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 45.

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Length: 29
Date of creation: Mar 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:tkk:dpaper:dp45

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Related research
Keywords: EU budget; voting power;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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  1. Kauppi, Heikki & Widgren, Mika, 2007. "Voting rules and budget allocation in the enlarged EU," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 693-706, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Kauppi, Heikki & Widgrén, Mika, 2008. "Do Benevolent Aspects Have Room in Explaining EU Budget Receipts?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6778, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-10.

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