Evan Osborne () (Department of Economics, Wright State University)
Abstract
Rivalries are a key aspect of sports, but one with few counterparts elsewhere in economic theory. In this paper rivalries are modeled as a habitual good, and complementary in fan utility with other trade between residents of team locations. Some implications for optimal team investment in rivalry capital, for league investment in competitive balance, and for the fundamental differences between rivalries in team and individual sports are derived.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by International Association of Sports Economists in its series Working Papers with number
0808.
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