This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Non-Neutrality Of Monetary Policy In Policy Games

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Nicola Acocella
Giovanni Di Bartolomeo

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

The main aim of this article is to investigate the sources of non-neutrality in policy games involving one or more trade unions. We use a simple set up in order to clearly expose the basic mechanisms that also work in more complex frameworks. We show that there are common roots in the nonneutrality results so far obtained in apparently different contexts as, e.g., an inflation-averse union playing against the government; a union sharing some other common objective with a policy maker; or when more than one union interacts with monopolistic competitors in the goods market and a policymaker. We finally show that there are other cases where the nonneutrality result can arise.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://dep.eco.uniroma1.it/docs/working_papers/Wp49.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: 2002
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Public Economics in its series Working Papers with number 49.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:sap:wpaper:49

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Via Del Castro Laurenziano 9, 00161 Roma
Phone: +39 6 49766353
Fax: +39 6 4462040
Web page: http://dep.eco.uniroma1.it/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Luisa Giuriato).

Related research
Keywords: neutrality; money; unions; policy game.;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E00 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - General
E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Hersoug, Tor, 1985. " Workers versus Government-Who Adjusts to Whom?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 87(2), pages 270-92.
  2. Cubitt, Robin P, 1997. " Stagflationary Bias and the Interaction of Monetary Policy and Wages in a Unionized Economy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 93(1-2), pages 165-78, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Svensson, Lars E O, 1995. "Optimal Inflation Targets, 'Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 1249, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model," NBER Working Papers 0807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2001. "Wage and public expenditure setting in a monetary union," Macroeconomics 0105002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Gylfason, Thorvaldur & Lindbeck, Assar, 1994. " The Interaction of Monetary Policy and Wages," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(1-2), pages 33-46, April.
    Other versions:
  7. Acocella, Nicola & Ciccarone, Giuseppe, 1997. " Trade Unions, Nonneutrality and Stagflation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 91(2), pages 161-78, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Gruner, Hans Peter & Hefeker, Carsten, 1999. " How Will EMU Affect Inflation and Unemployment in Europe?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 101(1), pages 33-47, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Guzzo, Vincenzo & Velasco, Andres, 1999. "The case for a populist Central Banker," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(7), pages 1317-1344, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Cukierman, Alex & Lippi, Francesco, 1998. "Central Bank Independence, Centralization of Wage Bargaining, Inflation and Unemployment - Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 1847, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Cukierman, Alex & Lippi, Francesco, 1999. "Central bank independence, centralization of wage bargaining, inflation and unemployment:: Theory and some evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(7), pages 1395-1434, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Jensen, Henrik, 1997. " Monetary Policy Cooperation May Not Be Counterproductive," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 99(1), pages 73-80, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Gylfason, Thorvaldur & Lindbeck, Assar, 1990. "Wages, money, and exchange rates with endogenous unions and governments," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 469-493. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Lippi, F., 2000. "Strategic Monetary Policy with Non-Atomistic Wage-Setters," Papers 374, Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi.
    Other versions:
  16. al-Nowaihi, Ali & Levine, Paul, 1994. "Can reputation resolve the monetary policy credibility problem?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 355-380, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Soskice, David & Iversen, Torben, 1998. "Multiple Wage-Bargaining Systems in the Single European Currency Area," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(3), pages 110-24, Autumn.
  18. Fabrizio Coricelli & Alex Cukierman & Alberto Dalmazzo, 2006. "Monetary Institutions, Monopolistic Competition, Unionized Labor Markets and Economic Performance," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 108(1), pages 39-63, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  19. Lawler, Phillip, 2000. "Union Wage Setting and Exchange Rate Policy," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 67(265), pages 91-100, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Lawler, Phillip, 2001. "Monetary Policy, Central Bank Objectives, and Social Welfare with Strategic Wage Setting," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(1), pages 94-113, January.
  21. David Soskice & Torben Iversen, 2000. "The Nonneutrality Of Monetary Policy With Large Price Or Wage Setters," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(1), pages 265-284, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Cubitt, Robin P, 1995. " Corporatism, Monetary Policy and Macroeconomic Performance: A Simple Game Theoretic Analysis," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 97(2), pages 245-59, June.
  23. Cukierman, Alex & Lippi, Francesco, 2001. "Labour Markets and Monetary Union: A Strategic Analysis," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(473), pages 541-65, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. N. Acocella & G. Bartolomeo & Andrew Hallett, 2006. "Controllability in Policy Games: Policy Neutrality and the Theory of Economic Policy Revisited," Computational Economics, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 91-112, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2005. "Controllability and non-neutrality of economic policy: The Tinbergen’s approach in a strategic context," Macroeconomics 0504034, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  3. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Douglas A. Jr. Hibbs, 2003. "Labor market regimes and monetary policy," Macroeconomics 0307012, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2005. "Is corporatism feasible?," Macroeconomics 0504037, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2003. "Is a conservative central banker a (perfect) substitute for wage coordination?," Macroeconomics 0307011, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Acocella Nicola & Di Bartolomeo Giovanni, 2007. "Towards a new theory of economic policy: Continuity and innovation," wp.comunite 0020, Department of Communication, University of Teramo. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Hibbs Jr., Douglas A., 2004. "Labor market regimes and the effects of monetary policy," Working Papers in Economics 145, Göteborg University, Department of Economics, revised 22 Apr 2005. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Pauwels, Wilfried, 2007. "Is there any scope for corporatism in stabilization policies?," MPRA Paper 3584, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  9. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2005. "Non-neutrality of economic policy: An application of the Tinbergen-Theil’s approach to a strategic context," Macroeconomics 0504035, EconWPA, revised 26 Apr 2005. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Giuseppe Ciccarone & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Enrico Marchetti, 2005. "Unions, fiscal policy and central bank transparency," Macroeconomics 0508004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2005. "Tinbergen And Theil Meet Nash: Controllability In Policy Games," Macroeconomics 0504036, EconWPA, revised 06 Sep 2005. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Cuciniello Vincenzo, 2007. "Optimal monetary policy in a monetary union with non-atomistic wage setters," wp.comunite 0014, Department of Communication, University of Teramo. [Downloadable!]
  13. Cuciniello, Vincenzo, 2007. "Strategic monetary policy in a monetary union with non-atomistic wage setters," MPRA Paper 3789, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jun 2007. [Downloadable!]
  14. Acocella Nicola & Di Bartolomeo Giovanni & Piacquadio Paolo Giovanni, 2009. "Conflict of interests, (implicit) coalitions and Nash policy games," wp.comunite 0054, Department of Communication, University of Teramo. [Downloadable!]
  15. Giuseppe Ciccarone & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Enrico Marchetti, 2005. "Supply-Side Fiscal Policy, Conservativeness, And Central Bank Transparency," Working Papers 77, Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Public Economics. [Downloadable!]
  16. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Patrizio Tirelli, 2004. "The macroeconomics of social pacts," Labor and Demography 0410003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  17. Vincenzo Cuciniello, 2007. "Optimal monetary policy under a floating regime with non-atomistic wage setters," HEI Working Papers 12-2007, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? There are NEP reports in over 80 fields that deliver new research to your email.

This page was last updated on 2009-10-28.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.