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Social Learning and Coordination Conventions in Intergenerational Games: An Experiment in Lamarckian Evolutionary Dynamics Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Barry Sopher () (Rutgers University)
Andrew Schotter () (New York University)
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Paper provided by Rutgers University, Department of Economics in its series Departmental Working Papers with number
200021.
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Date of creation: 24 Oct 2000Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:rut:rutres:200021Contact details of provider: Postal: New Jersey Hall - 75 Hamilton Street, New Brunswick, NJ 08901-1248 Phone: (732) 932-7482 Fax: (732) 932-7416 Web page: http://snde.rutgers.edu/Rutgers/wp/rutgers-wplist.html More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: coordination conventions ; experimental games ; intergenerational games ; social learning ; Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Samuelson, L. & Zhang, J., 1991.
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Young, H Peyton, 1993.
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Crawford, Vincent P., 1991.
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Other versions: Kandori, Michihiro, 1992.
"Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players ,"
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Young, H Peyton, 1996.
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"Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure ,"
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references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Shotter, A. & Sopher, B., 2001.
"Advice and Behavior in Intergenerational Ultimatum Games: An Experimental Approach ,"
Working Papers
01-04, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Schotter, A. & Sopher, B., 2001.
"Social Learning and Coordination Conventions in Inter-Generational Games: An Experimental Study ,"
Working Papers
01-10, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Schotter, A. & Sopher, B., 2000.
"Creating Culture in the Lab: Equilibrium Conventions in Inter-Generational Ultimatum Games ,"
Working Papers
00-07, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
[Downloadable!]
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