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Family Bargaining and Welfare

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Author Info
Luis Rubalcava
Duncan Thomas

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Abstract

Recent research on household behavior suggests that, ceteris paribus, a woman's "power" within a household influences consumption and time allocation choices. From an empirical point of view, a central stumbling block in this line of inquiry has been identification of sources of "power" that can plausibly be treated as exogenous. Aid to Families with Dependent Children, AFDC, was paid only to single women with children. The benefit level provides a natural fall-back for a low-income woman with children who is contemplating separation from her partner. As AFDC payments increase, separation will become more attractive and, the authors conjecture, the relative bargaining power of the woman in a household should also increase. If this is true, and if bargaining power does affect allocation decisions within the household, then the AFDC benefit level should affect household choices in intact families. This hypothesis is tested using the Panel Study of Income Data from 1968 through 1992.

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Paper provided by RAND Corporation Publications Department in its series Working Papers with number 00-10.

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Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: 2000
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Handle: RePEc:ran:wpaper:00-10

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Related research
Keywords: FAMILY ; WOMEN ; BARGAINING ; DECISION MAKING ; SOCIAL WELFARE;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
J10 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - General
J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1992. "Collective Labor Supply and Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 437-67, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Moffitt, Robert, 1992. "Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System: A Review," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 30(1), pages 1-61, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1997. "Introducing Household Production in Collective Models of Labor Supply," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 191-209, February.
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  4. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1993. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(6), pages 988-1010, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Martin Browning & P.A. Chiappori, 1996. "Efficient Intra-Household Allocations - A General Characterization and Empirical Tests," Discussion Papers 96-10, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
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  6. Becker, Gary S, 1974. "A Theory of Marriage: Part II," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(2), pages S11-S26, Part II, . [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Jonathan Gruber, 1996. "Cash Welfare as a Consumption Smoothing Mechanism for Single Mothers," NBER Working Papers 5738, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1988. "Rational Household Labor Supply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 63-90, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. François Bourguignon & Martin Browning & Pierre-André Chiappori & Valérie Lechene, 1993. "Intra Household Allocation of Consumption: A Model and some Evidence from French Data," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 29, pages 08, Janvier-M. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Schultz, T.P., 1990. "Testing The Neoclassical Model Of Family Labor Supply And Fertility," Papers 601, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
  11. Bourguignon, Francois & Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1992. "Collective models of household behavior : An introduction," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(2-3), pages 355-364, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Browning, Martin & Francois Bourguignon & Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Valerie Lechene, 1994. "Income and Outcomes: A Structural Model of Intrahousehold Allocation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(6), pages 1067-96, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Hilary Williamson Hoynes, 1995. "Does Welfare Play Any Role in Female Headship Decisions?," NBER Working Papers 5149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Lundberg, S.J. & Pollak, R.A. & Wales, T.J., 1994. "Do Husbands and Wives Pool Their Resources? Evidence from U.K. Child Benefit," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 94-6, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Sonia Oreffice, 2003. "Abortion and Female Power in the Household Evidence from Labor Supply," Working Papers 2003.41, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  2. Marcos A. Rangel & Duncan Thomas, 2006. "Out of West Africa: Evidence on the Efficient Allocation of Resources within Farm Households," Working Papers 0515, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  3. Eric Edmonds & Kristin Mammen & Douglas L. Miller, 2004. "Rearranging the Family? Income Support and Elderly Living Arrangements in a Low Income Country," NBER Working Papers 10306, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Olivier Bargain & Miriam Beblo & Denis Beninger & Richard Blundell & Raquel Carrasco & Maria-Concetta Chiuri & François Laisney & Valérie Lechene & Nicolas Moreau & Michal Myck & Javier Ruiz-Castill, 2006. "Does the Representation of Household Behavior Matter for Welfare Analysis of Tax-benefit Policies? An Introduction," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 99-111, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Elizabeth M. Caucutt & Nezih Guner & John Knowles, 2002. "Why Do Women Wait? Matching, Wage Inequality, and the Incentives for Fertility Delay," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 5(4), pages 815-855, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Xu, Zeyu, 2007. "A survey on intra-household models and evidence," MPRA Paper 3763, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  7. Martina Menon & Federico Perali & Luca Piccoli, 2008. "The passive drinking effect: Evidence from Italy," PSE Working Papers 2008-33, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
  8. François Bourguignon & Martin Browning & Pierre-André Chiappori, 2006. "Efficient Intra-household Allocations and Distribution Factors: Implications and Identification," CAM Working Papers 2006-02, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Applied Microeconometrics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Bargain, Olivier & Moreau, Nicolas, 2005. "Cooperative Models in Action: Simulation of a Nash-Bargaining Model of Household Labor Supply with Taxation," IZA Discussion Papers 1480, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  10. Marcos Rangel, 2005. "Alimony Rights and Intrahousehold Allocation of Resources: Evidence from Brazil," Working Papers 0505, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  11. Pierre-André Chiappori & Bernard Fortin & Guy Lacroix, 2001. "Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation and Household Labor Supply," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-16, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Martin Browning & Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Arthur Lewbel, 2006. "Estimating Consumption Economies of Scale, Adult Equivalence Scales, and Household Bargaining Power," Economics Series Working Papers 289, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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