This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

On redistribution effects of public debt amongst single-minded generations

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Canegrati, Emanuele

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In this paper I will introduce a new political economy model, where there exists a competition amongst two political candidates, which aim to set a policy which enables them to win elections, max- imising the probability of winning. I will show that, if taxes neces- sary to repay the debt are not lump sum but proportional to income, we have dramatic distorting effect on the labour supply. The prob- lem is exacerbate once we take into account that the Government set taxes in order to favour the most in‡uencing social group. As a consequence, effective marginal tax rates are differentiated amongst social groups and thus the burden of public debt is not equally borne.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2254/
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 2254.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 14 Mar 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:2254

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).

Related research
Keywords: public debt; single-mindedness; intergenerational redistribution;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
J20 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - General
H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management
D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
J26 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Retirement; Retirement Policies
H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
J18 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Public Policy
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
J14 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped
D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism
H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Feldstein, Martin, 1982. "Government deficits and aggregate demand," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 1-20. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Casey B Mulligan, 1999. "Gerontocracy, Retirement, and Social Security," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 154, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Feldstein, Martin & Liebman, Jeffrey B., 2002. "Social security," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 32, pages 2245-2324 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Peter Diamond, 2005. "Pensions for an Aging Population," NBER Working Papers 11877, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Feldstein, Martin S, 1976. "Perceived Wealth in Bonds and Social Security: A Comment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(2), pages 331-36, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. canegrati, emanuele, 2007. "A theory of the allocation of political time," MPRA Paper 1647, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  7. Buchanan, James M, 1976. "Barro on the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(2), pages 337-42, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. McCallum, Bennett T, 1984. "Are Bond-Financed Deficits Inflationary? A Ricardian Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(1), pages 123-35, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Courtney Coile & Jonathan Gruber, 2000. "Social Security and Retirement," NBER Working Papers 7830, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Laurence J. Kotlikoff & David Rapson, 2005. "Comparing Average and Marginal Tax Rates Under the FairTax and the Current System of Federal Taxation," NBER Working Papers 11831, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Hinich, Melvin J., 1977. "Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter result is an artifact," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 208-219, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Koskela, Erkki & Schob, Ronnie, 2002. " Optimal Factor Income Taxation in the Presence of Unemployment," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(3), pages 387-404. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Casey B. Mulligan & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 2003. "Social Security, Retirement, and the Single-Mindedness of the Electorate," NBER Working Papers 9691, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Jeremy Greenwood & Guillaume Vandenbroucke, 2005. "Hours Worked (Long-Run Trends)," Economie d'Avant Garde Research Reports 10, Economie d'Avant Garde. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Clemens Fuest & Bernd Huber, . "Tax Coordination and Unemployment," EPRU Working Paper Series 97-26, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  16. Martin Feldstein, 1988. "The Effects of Fiscal Policies When Incomes are Uncertain: A Contradiction to Ricardian Equivalence," NBER Working Papers 2062, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  17. Casey B. Mulligan & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 1999. "Social Security in Theory and Practice (I): Facts and Political Theories," Economics Working Papers 384, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  18. O'Driscoll, Gerald P, Jr, 1977. "The Ricardian Nonequivalence Theorem," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(1), pages 207-10, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Peter Diamond & Jonathan Gruber, 1997. "Social Security and Retirement in the U.S," NBER Working Papers 6097, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Douglas A. Hershey & Kène Henkens & Hendrik P. van Dalen, 2006. "Mapping the Minds of Retirement Planners," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-038/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  21. Casey B. Mulligan & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 1999. "Social Security in Theory and Practice (II): Efficiency Theories, Narrative Theories, and Implications for Reform," Economics Working Papers 385, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  22. Paola Profeta, 2002. "Retirement and Social Security in a Probabilistic Voting Model," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 331-348, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Want to help out with this project? Look for volunteer opportunities.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-15.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.