Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter?

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Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter?

Author Info

Bossert, W.
Brams, S.J.
Kilgour, D.M.

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Abstract

In this paper we will describe a class of three-person games and draw general conclusions about non-cooperative behavior in them.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 2000-15.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mtl:montec:2000-15

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Article
- Bossert, Walter & Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2002. "Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 185-202, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paper
- Bossert, W. & Brams, S. J. & Kilgour, D. M., 2000. "Cooperative vs. Non-Cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, But Does That Matter?," Working Papers 00-19, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
- BOSSERT, Walter & BRAMS, Steven J. & KILGOUR, D. Marc, 2000. "Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter?," Cahiers de recherche 2000-15, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. [Downloadable!]

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Brams, S. J. & Kilgour, M. D., 2001. "Games That End in a Bang or a Whimper," Working Papers 01-05, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
Kilgour, D.M. & Brams, S.J., 1996. "Backward Induction is not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem," Working Papers 96-21, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]

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