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Lobbying and Rent-Seeking for Public Goods in a Fiscally Centralized System

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Author Info
Cheikbossian, G.
Abstract

We analyze a centralized system as one in which a political authority finances by general taxation two local public goods each one associated with a particular region. Because individuals in the two regions have different preferences, they engage in rent-seeking activities to influence centralized policy-making in their preferred direction. Several results emerge from the analysis and in particular rent-seeking is shown to be increasing in taste heterogeneity and in the degree of spillovers.

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File URL: http://www.laser.univ-montp1.fr/Cahiers/cahier120304.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1 in its series Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers) with number 2004.12.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mop:lasrwp:2004.12

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Postal: Université de Montpellier 1, Faculté des Sciences Economiques, LASER, Av. de la Mer - Espace Richter, CS 79606, 34960 Montpellier Cedex 2, France
Web page: http://www.laser.univ-montp1.fr
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Related research
Keywords: (LOCAL) PUBLIC GOODS ; RENT-SEEKING ; GENERAL TAXATION ; SPILLOVERS;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Nti, Kofi O, 1999. " Rent-Seeking with Asymmetric Valuations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 98(3-4), pages 415-30, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Coughlin, Peter J & Mueller, Dennis C & Murrell, Peter, 1990. "Electoral Politics, Interest Groups, and the Size of Government," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(4), pages 682-705, October.
  3. Nti, Kofi O., 1998. "Effort and performance in group contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 769-781, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Common Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 923-42, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Redoano, Michela & Scharf, Kimberley Ann, 2002. "The Political Economy of Policy Centralization: Direct Versus Representative Democracy," CEPR Discussion Papers 3631, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Alberto Alesina & Ignazio Angeloni & Federico Etro, 2001. "Institutional Rules for Federations," NBER Working Papers 8646, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Lockwood, Ben, 2002. "Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 69(2), pages 313-37, April.
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  8. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Besley, Timothy J. & Coate, Stephen, 2000. "Centralized versus Decentralized Provision of Local Public Goods: a Political Economy Analysis," CEPR Discussion Papers 2495, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Baik, Kyung Hwan, 1993. "Effort levels in contests : The public-good prize case," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 363-367. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Esteban, J. & Ray, D., 1999. "Collective Action and Group Size Paradox," Papers 23, El Instituto de Estudios Economicos de Galicia Pedro Barrie de la Maza.
  12. Lorz, Oliver, 2001. "On the effects of capital mobility on local infrastructure policy and rent-seeking," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2-3), pages 319-337, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Coughlin, Peter J. & Mueller, Dennis C. & Murrell, Peter, 1990. "A model of electroral competition with interest groups," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 307-311, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Weingast, Barry R & Shepsle, Kenneth A & Johnsen, Christopher, 1981. "The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 642-64, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Datta-Chaudhuri, Mrinal, 1990. "Market Failure and Government Failure," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 4(3), pages 25-39, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Riaz, Khalid & Shogren, Jason F & Johnson, Stanley R, 1995. " A General Model of Rent Seeking for Public Goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 82(3-4), pages 243-59, March.
  17. Guillaume Cheikbossian, 2000. "Federalism, distributive politics and representative democracy," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 105-122, 07.
  18. Katz, Eliakim & Nitzan, Shmuel & Rosenberg, Jacob, 1990. " Rent-Seeking for Pure Public Goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 49-60, April.
  19. Magee, Christopher, 2002. "Endogenous trade policy and lobby formation: an application to the free-rider problem," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 449-471, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Cheikbossian, Guillaume, 2005. "Heterogenous Groups and Rent-Seeking for Public Goods," Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers) 2005.16, LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1. [Downloadable!]
  2. Feng Xie & David Levinson, 2009. "Governance choice on a serial network," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(1), pages 189-212, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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