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Information and Beliefs in a Repeated Normal-Form Game

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Author Info
Fehr, Dietmar () (Technical University of Berlin)
Kübler, Dorothea () (Technical University of Berlin)
Danz, David N. () (Technical University of Berlin)

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Abstract

We study beliefs and choices in a repeated normal-form game. In addition to a baseline treatment with common knowledge of the game structure and feedback about choices in the previous period, we run treatments (i) without feedback about previous play, (ii) with no information about the opponent’s payoffs and (iii) with random matching. Using Stahl and Wilson’s (1995) model of limited strategic reasoning, we classify behavior with regard to its strategic sophistication and consider its development over time. We use belief statements to check for the consistency of subjects’ actions with the stated beliefs as well as for the accuracy of their beliefs (relative to the opponent’s true choice). In the baseline treatment we observe more sophisticated play as well as more accurate beliefs and more best responses to beliefs over time. We isolate feedback as the main driving force of learning to play strategically and to form beliefs that accurately predict the behavior of the opponent.

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Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 3627.

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Date of creation: Aug 2008
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Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3627

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Related research
Keywords: beliefs experiments strategic uncertainty learning

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Wolf Ze'ev Ehrblatt & Kyle Hyndman & Erkut Y. ÄOzbay & Andrew Schotter, 2006. "Convergence: An Experimental Study," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001148, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Vincent P Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2007. "Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000001005, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. MIGUEL A. COSTA-GOMES & GEORG WEIZSÄCKER, 2008. "Stated Beliefs and Play in Normal-Form Games," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 75(3), pages 729-762, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Pedro Rey Biel, 2005. "Equilibrium PLay and Best Response to (Stated) Beliefs in Constant Sum Games," Experimental 0506003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Kandori, Michihiro, 1992. "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(1), pages 63-80, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Vincent P. Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2007. "Fatal Attraction: Salience, Naivete, and Sophistication in Experimental Hide-and-Seek Games," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000861, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Weber, Roberto A., 2003. "'Learning' with no feedback in a competitive guessing game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 134-144, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1231-40, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Anke Gerber, . "Learning in and about Games," IEW - Working Papers iewwp234, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
  10. Oechssler, Jorg & Schipper, Burkhard, 2003. "Can you guess the game you are playing?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 137-152, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Colin F. Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho & Juin-Kuan Chong, 2004. "A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 119(3), pages 861-898, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Miguel Costa-Gomes & Vincent P. Crawford & Bruno Broseta, . "Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games:An Experimental Study," Discussion Papers 00/45, Department of Economics, University of York. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Asen Ivanov, 2008. "Strategic Play and Risk Aversion in One-Shot Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 0802, VCU School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  14. Yaw Nyarko & Andrew Schotter, 2002. "An Experimental Study of Belief Learning Using Elicited Beliefs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 971-1005, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Viktor Winschel & Markus Krätzig, 2008. "JBendge: An Object-Oriented System for Solving, Estimating and Selecting Nonlinear Dynamic Models," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2008-034, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  2. Anton Andriyashin, 2008. "Stock Picking via Nonsymmetrically Pruned Binary Decision Trees," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2008-035, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  3. Enzo Giacomini & Wolfgang Härdle & Volker Krätschmer, 2008. "Dynamic Semiparametric Factor Models in Risk Neutral Density Estimation," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2008-038, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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