We analyze time-costly decision-making in committees by privately informed individuals, such as juries, panels, boards, etc. In the spirit of the Coase Conjecture, we show that the decision is "almost instantaneous" when individuals entertain identical objectives. Delay can only be understood as the outcome of conflicting (biased) objectives.
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Paper provided by Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences in its series IEHAS Discussion Papers with number
0415.
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