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Metamimetic Games : Modeling Metadynamics in Social Cognition

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Author Info
David Chavalarias () (CREA - Centre de recherche en épistémologie appliquée - CNRS : UMR7656 - Polytechnique - X)
Abstract

Imitation is fundamental in the understanding of social system dynamics. But the diversity of imitation rules employed by modelers proves that the modeling of mimetic processes cannot avoid the traditional problem of endogenization of all the choices, including the one of the mimetic rules. Starting from the remark that human reflexive capacities are the ground for a new class of mimetic rules, I propose a formal framework, metamimetic games, that enable to endogenize the distribution of imitation rules while being human specific. The corresponding concepts of equilibrium - counterfactually stable state - and attractor are introduced. Finally, I give an interpretation of social differentiation in terms of cultural co-evolution among a set of possible motivations, which departs from the traditional view of optimization indexed to criteria that exist prior to the activity of agents.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00007743_v3.

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Date of creation: 2006
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Publication status: Published, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 2006, vol. 9, no. 2, 32 p.
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00007743_v3

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Related research
Keywords: Social cognition; imitation; cultural co-evolution; differentiation; reflexivity; metacognition; stochastic game theory; endogenous distributions; metamimetic games; counterfactual equilibrium.;

References listed on IDEAS
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  2. Day, Richard H. & Huang, Weihong, 1990. "Bulls, bears and market sheep," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 299-329, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215.
  5. Frank, Joshua, 2003. "Natural selection, rational economic behavior, and alternative outcomes of the evolutionary process," The Journal of Socio-Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 601-622, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Reinhard Selten & Axel Ostmann, 2000. "Imitation Equilibrium," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse16_2000, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Rosaria Conte & Mario Paolucci, 2001. "Intelligent Social Learning," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 4. [Downloadable!]
  8. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Arthur, W Brian, 1994. "Inductive Reasoning and Bounded Rationality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 406-11, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. David Chavalarias, 2007. "Endogenous distributions in multi-agents models: the example of endogenization of ends and time constants," Working Papers hal-00135962_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
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