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Earned Wealth, Engaged Bidders? Evidence from a second price auction

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Author Info
Nicolas Jacquemet () (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris)
Stephane Luchini () (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - CNRS : UMR6579)
Robert-Vincent Joule () (LPS-EHESS - Laboratoire de Psychologie Sociale - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS))
Jason Shogren () (Departement Economy and Finance, University of Wyoming - University of Wyoming)

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Abstract

Recent work in experimental economics has explored whether observed behavior depends on whether wealth was windfall or earned. This paper extends this work by considering whether earned wealth ffects bidding behavior in an induced-value second-price auction. We find people bid more sincerely in the auction with earned wealth given monetary incentives; earned wealth did not induce sincere bidding in hypothetical auctions.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number halshs-00277283_v1.

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Date of creation: 06 May 2008
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Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00277283_v1

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Related research
Keywords: Auctions; Demand revelation; Experimental valuation; Hypothetical bias; Earned Money;

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