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Incentive Compatible Information Transfer Between Asymmetrically Informed Principals

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Author Info
Bond, E.W.
Gresik, T.A.

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Abstract

In this paper, the authors use a model of tax competition to study the role of information sharing in common agency problems.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics in its series Papers with number 8-98-1.

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Length: 45 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:pensta:8-98-1

Contact details of provider:
Postal: PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY PARK PENNSYLVANIA 16802 U.S.A.
Phone: (814)865-1456
Fax: (814)863-4775
Web page: http://econ.la.psu.edu/
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Related research
Keywords: INFORMATION ; GAME THEORY ; ASYMETRIC INFORMATION;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Diaw, K.M. & Pouyet J.,, 2004. "Competition, incomplete discrimination and versioning," Discussion Paper 69, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Diaw, K.M. & Pouyet, J., 2004. "The dilemma of tax competition : how (not) to attract (inefficient) firms?," Discussion Paper 68, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  3. Khaled Diaw & Jérôme Pouyet, 2005. "Information, competition and (In) complete discrimination," Working Papers hal-00243025_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
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This page was last updated on 2009-10-24.


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