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Experimentation, Imitation, and Stochastic Stability

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Author Info
Gale, D.
Rosental, R.W.

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Abstract

In this paper we model the dynamic interaction of two types of agents, experimenters and imitators, whose behavior is characterized by simple rules of thumb. The agents repeatedly play a one-shot game in which the agent's actions are strategic substitutes.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Boston University - Industry Studies Programme in its series Papers with number 65.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:bostin:65

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Postal: Boston University, Industry Studies Program; Department of Economics, 270 Bay Road, Boston, Massachusetts 02215.
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Web page: http://www.bu.edu/econ/isp/
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Related research
Keywords: ECONOMIC MODELS; ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM; GAME THEORY;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other

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  1. Myrna Wooders & Edward Cartwright & Reinhard Selten, 2003. "Social Conformity in Games with Many Players," Working Papers 2003.121, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Possajennikov, A., 1999. "Optimality of imitative behavior in Cournot oligopoly," Discussion Paper 2, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  3. Cartwright, Edward, 2003. "Imitation and the Emergence of Nash Equilibrium Play in Games with Many Players," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 684, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Lars P. Feld & Benno Torgler & Bin Ding, 2008. "Coming Closer? Tax Morale, Deterrence and Social Learning after German Unification," School of Economics and Finance Discussion Papers and Working Papers Series 232, School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology, revised 16 Jun 2008. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Wooders, Myrna & Edward Cartwright & Selten, Reinhard, 2002. "Social Conformity And Equilibrium In Pure Strategies In Games With Many Players," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 636, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Ilaria Foroni & Anna Agliari, 2008. "Complex Price Dynamics in a Financial Market with Imitation," Computational Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 21-36, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Edward Cartwright, 2004. "Learning to Play Approximate Nash Equilibria in Games with Many Players," Working Papers 2004.85, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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