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Social Capital and Incentive Compatibility: Modelling the Accumulation and Use of Social Collateral

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Mogues, Tewodaj (U of Wisconsin)
Carter, Michael R.

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Abstract

In economics, where the long resistance to reflecting on the effects of social interaction on economic behaviour is slowly waning, the concept of social capital may turn out to be a useful analytical tool. However, initial interest in social capital has produced a large variety of definitions, theoretical frameworks, empirical analyses, and even policy prescriptions. This paper provides a selective review and critique of some of the more recent literature on social capital. It then suggests that many of the problems in the existing literature can be addressed by lowering aspirations about what social capital is and reformulating it in terms of its impact on incentive problems in economic transactions in the presence of imperfect markets and costly or non-enforceable contracts. The paper finally advances a model of one of the ways that social capital resolves incentive compatibility problems, namely its role as a collateral asset.

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Paper provided by University of Wisconsin, Agricultural and Applied Economics in its series Staff Paper Series with number 460.

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Date of creation: Sep 2003
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Handle: RePEc:ecl:wisagr:460

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  1. Ghosh, Parikshit & Ray, Debraj, 1996. "Cooperation in Community Interaction without Information Flows," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(3), pages 491-519, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Woolcock, Michael & Narayan, Deepa, 2000. "Social Capital: Implications for Development Theory, Research, and Policy," World Bank Research Observer, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(2), pages 225-49, August.
  3. Carter, Michael R. & Castillo, Marco, 2003. "An Experimental Approach to Social Capital in South Africa," Staff Paper Series 448, University of Wisconsin, Agricultural and Applied Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Elster, Jon, 1989. "Social Norms and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 99-117, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Andrew D. Foster & Mark R. Rosenzweig, 2001. "Imperfect Commitment, Altruism, And The Family: Evidence From Transfer Behavior In Low-Income Rural Areas," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 83(3), pages 389-407, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Laing, Derek, 1994. "Firm Specific Human Capital as an Employer Discipline Device," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 32(1), pages 128-37, January.
  7. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 1985. "Finitely Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 905-22, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Hashimoto, Masanori, 1981. "Firm-Specific Human Capital as a Shared Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 475-82, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Narayan, Deepa & Pritchett, Lant, 1997. "Cents and sociability : household income and social capital in rural Tanzania," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1796, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Samuel Bowles & Astrid Hopfensitz, 2000. "The Co-evolution of Individual Behaviors and Social Institutions," Working Papers 00-12-073, Santa Fe Institute.
  11. Samuel Bowles, 1998. "Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 75-111, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. repec:att:wimass:19199929 is not listed on IDEAS
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