This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

A Game-Theoretic Analysis of China's WTO Accession

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Eric W. Bond (Pennsylvania State University)
Stephen Ching (City University of Hong Kong)
Edwin Lai () (City University of Hong Kong)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper studies the determination of split if gains among the negotiating parties (member countries and the acceding country) in a WTO accession negotiation using a sequential bargaining model. In particular, we are interested in the effect of the most-favoured-nation (MFN) principle on the negotiation outcome. The MFN principle says that any tariff reduction offered by the applicant for accession has to be automatically granted to all existing members. This implies that any deal that an applicant, such as China, makes with a member can be made more unfavourable to China in subsequent negotiations. On the other hand, since China has the foresight that giving up each dollar to one country means giving up many dollars, this would harden China’s bargaining position. Resorting to intuition alone, therefore, it is not clear whether China would benefit or be disadvantaged by the existence of MFN. Using the model, however we find unambiguously that China’s share of surplus is more when MFN is in place.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.eaber.org/intranet/documents/22/164/CUHK_Bond_02_2.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First Version, 2005
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by East Asian Bureau of Economic Research in its series Trade Working Papers with number 164.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:eab:tradew:164

Contact details of provider:
Postal: JG Crawford Building #13, Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government, Australian National University, ACT 0200
Web page: http://www.eaber.org
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Sam Engele).

Related research
Keywords: WTO; accession; negotiation;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D0 - Microeconomics - - General
F1 - International Economics - - Trade

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W., 2001. "Reciprocity, non-discrimination and preferential agreements in the multilateral trading system," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 281-325, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Bond, Eric W & Syropoulos, Costas & Winters, L. Alan, 2000. "Deepening of Regional Integration and Multilateral Trade Agreements," CEPR Discussion Papers 2480, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Edwin L.-C. Lai, 2008. "The most-favored nation rule in club enlargement negotiation," Working Papers 0815, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. [Downloadable!]
  2. Ludema, Rodney D & Mayda, Anna Maria, 2005. "Do Countries Free Ride on MFN?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5160, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? LogEc provides statistical analysis about downloads from this service (and others).

This page was last updated on 2009-10-23.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.