This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Accession Rule and Trade Agreements: The Case of the WTO

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Eric W. Bond (Pennsylvania State University)
Stephen Ching (City University of Hong Kong)
Edwin Lai () (City University of Hong Kong)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to present a model of the WTO accession process, and to examine how previous rounds of trade liberalization affect the distribution of gains from accession between the members and the acceding countries. We consider a three country model in which two countries have previously negotiated a trade agreement, with the third country being initially left out of the agreement for exogenous (e.g. political) reasons. We then examine the negotiation between the acceding country and the member countries over the tariff concessions to be made by the acceding country as a condition of entry, using a model of the negotiation process suggested by the WTO accession process. Our modeling approach is intended to capture several key features of the WTO tariff negotiation process.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.eaber.org/intranet/documents/22/163/CUHK_Bond_02.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First Version, 2005
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by East Asian Bureau of Economic Research in its series Trade Working Papers with number 163.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:eab:tradew:163

Contact details of provider:
Postal: JG Crawford Building #13, Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government, Australian National University, ACT 0200
Web page: http://www.eaber.org
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Sam Engele).

Related research
Keywords: WTO; accession rules; trade agreements; GATT; trade liberalization;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Country and Industry Studies of Trade
F16 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Labor Market Interactions
O11 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
O19 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Rolf J. Langhammer & Matthias Lücke, 1999. "WTO Accession Issues," The World Economy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 22(6), pages 837-873, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Bond, Eric W & Syropoulos, Costas & Winters, L. Alan, 2000. "Deepening of Regional Integration and Multilateral Trade Agreements," CEPR Discussion Papers 2480, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1999. "Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Bilateral Opportunism and the Rules of GATT," NBER Working Papers 7071, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Richardson, Martin, 1995. "Tariff revenue competition in a free trade area," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(7), pages 1429-1437, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Seidmann, Daniel J & Winter, Eyal, 1998. "A Theory of Gradual Coalition Formation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 65(4), pages 793-815, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2004. "Backward stealing and forward manipulation in the WTO," Discussion Papers 0405-06, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. repec:att:wimass:192049 is not listed on IDEAS
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About five million pdf files are downloaded through RePEc every year.

This page was last updated on 2009-10-23.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.