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Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring

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Author Info
Dilip Abreu
David G. Pearce
Ennio Stacchetti
Abstract

There exist optimal symmetric equilibria in the Green-Porter model [5, 8] having an elementary intertemporal structure. Such an equilibrium is described entirely by two subsets of price space and two quantities, the only production levels used by firms in any contingency. The central technique employed in the analysis is the reduction of the repeated game to a family of static games.

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Paper provided by Cowles Foundation, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 726.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Oct 1984
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Publication status: Published in Journal of Economic Theory (June 1986), 39(1): 251-269
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:726

Note: CFP 656.
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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA

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Keywords: Optimal symmetric cartel equilibria; cartels; imperfect monitoring;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Porter, Robert H., 1983. "Optimal cartel trigger price strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 313-338, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Radner, Roy, 1985. "Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1173-98, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Radner, Roy & Myerson, Roger & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(1), pages 59-69, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Carl Davidson & Raymond Deneckere, 1984. "Excess Capacity and Collusion," Discussion Papers 675, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Davidson, Carl & Deneckere, Raymond J, 1990. "Excess Capacity and Collusion," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(3), pages 521-41, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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