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Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Ellingsen, Tore
Johannesson, Magnus
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Many people are sensitive to social esteem, and their pride is a source of pro--social behavior. We present a game-theoretic model in which sensitivity to esteem varies across players and may depend on context as well players' beliefs about their opponents. For example, the pride associated with a generous image is greater when the player holding the image is in fact generous and believes the observers to be generous as well. The model can account both for the fact that players' behaviour sometimes depends on the opponents' unchosen options and for the prevalence of small symbolic gifts. Perhaps most importantly, the model offers an explanation for motivational crowding out: Control systems and pecuniary incentives may erode morale by signalling to the agent that the principal is not worth impressing.
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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number
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Date of creation: Jul 2006Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5768Contact details of provider: Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 53--56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801 Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
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Keywords: esteem ; framing ; incentives ; motivational crowding out ; social preferences ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Social Norms and Social Capital; Social Networks Economic Anthropology
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