This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Eliaz, Kfir
Spiegler, Ran
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
A principal contracts with agents who have diverse abilities to forecast changes in their future tastes. While the principal knows that the agent’s tastes are changing, the agent believes that with probability ?, their future preferences will be identical to their present preferences. The principal does not observe ?, but knows the probability distribution from which it is drawn. Thus, the agent’s prior probability ? is their ‘private type’, and the principal has to offer a menu of contracts in order to screen the agent’s type. We provide a full characterization of the principal’s optimal menu. The results allow us to interpret some real-life contractual arrangements in a variety of examples.
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page . Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number
4573.
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract ),
plain text
(with abstract ),
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Aug 2004Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4573Contact details of provider: Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 53--56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801 Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
Order Information: Email:
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().
Keywords: contracts ; dynamic inconsistency ; naivety ; non-common priors ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports :
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Ran Spiegler, 2005.
"Competition over Agents with Boundedly Rational Expectations ,"
Levine's Bibliography
122247000000000535, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2002.
"Self-Confidence And Personal Motivation ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 117(3), pages 871-915, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Manuel Amador & George-Marios Angeletos & Ivan Werning, 2004.
"Commitment vs. Flexibility ,"
2004 Meeting Papers
87, Society for Economic Dynamics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Manuel Amador & Ivan Werning & George-Marios Angeletos, 2003.
"Commitment Vs. Flexibility ,"
NBER Working Papers
10151, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Manuel Amador & Iván Werning & George-Marios Angeletos, 2006.
"Commitment vs. Flexibility ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 74(2), pages 365-396, 03.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Stefano Della Vigna & Ulrike Malmendier, 2004.
"Contract Design and Self-control: Theory and Evidence ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 119(2), pages 353-402, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, 1999.
"Incentives For Procrastinators ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 114(3), pages 769-816, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Esteban, Susanna & Miyagawa, Eiichi & Shum, Matthew, 2007.
"Nonlinear pricing with self-control preferences ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 306-338, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Matt Shum & S Esteban & E Miyagawa, 2003.
"Nonlinear Pricing with Self-Control Preferences ,"
Economics Working Paper Archive
503, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Esteban, Susanna & Miyagawa, Eiichi & Shum, Matthew, 2003.
"Nonlinear Pricing with Self-Control Preferences ,"
Working Papers
10-03-1, Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Susanna Esteban & Eiichi Miyagawa & Matthew Shum, 2003.
"Nonlinear Pricing with Self-Control Preferences ,"
Discussion Papers
0304-03, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Spiegler, Ran, 2006.
"Competition over agents with boundedly rational expectations ,"
Theoretical Economics ,
Society for Economic Theory, vol. 1(2), pages 207-231, June.
[Downloadable!]
Leeat Yariv, 2004.
"Safety in Markets: An Impossibility Theorem for Dutch Books ,"
Theory workshop papers
658612000000000072, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Muhamet Yildiz, 2003.
"Bargaining without a Common Prior-An Immediate Agreement Theorem ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 71(3), pages 793-811, 05.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Michele Piccione & Ariel Rubinstein, 2003.
"Modeling the Economic Interaction of Agents With Diverse Abilities to Recognize Equilibrium Patterns ,"
Journal of the European Economic Association ,
MIT Press, vol. 1(1), pages 212-223, 03.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Hanming Fang & Giuseppe Moscarini, 2003.
"Morale Hazard ,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1422, Cowles Foundation, Yale University.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Hanming Fang & Giuseppe Moscarini, 2004.
"Morale Hazard ,"
Yale School of Management Working Papers
ysm386, Yale School of Management.
[Downloadable!] Fang, Hanming & Moscarini, Giuseppe, 2005.
"Morale hazard ,"
Journal of Monetary Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 52(4), pages 749-777, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Leeat Yariv & David Laibson, 2004.
"Safety in Markets: An Impossibility Theorem for Dutch Books ,"
2004 Meeting Papers
867, Society for Economic Dynamics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Malmendier, Ulrike M. & Della Vigna, Stefano, 2003.
"Overestimating Self-Control: Evidence from the Health Club Industry ,"
Research Papers
1800, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
[Downloadable!]
Ted O' Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, 2001.
"Choice and Procrastination ,"
Microeconomics
0012002, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!]
Ran Spiegler, 2006.
"The Market for Quacks ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 73(4), pages 1113-1131, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, 1999.
"Doing It Now or Later ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 103-124, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Gilpatric, Scott M., 2008.
"Present-biased preferences, self-awareness and shirking ,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ,
Elsevier, vol. 67(3-4), pages 735-754, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, 2001.
"Choice And Procrastination ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 116(1), pages 121-160, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, 2003.
"Projection Bias In Predicting Future Utility ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 118(4), pages 1209-1248, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
George Loewenstein, Ted O'Donoghue and Matthew Rabin., 2000.
"Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility ,"
Economics Working Papers
E00-284, University of California at Berkeley.
[Downloadable!] George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, 2000.
"Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility ,"
Department of Economics, Working Paper Series
1029, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
[Downloadable!] George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, 2001.
"Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility ,"
General Economics and Teaching
0012003, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!] Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2001.
"Temptation and Self-Control ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 69(6), pages 1403-1435, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Inderst, Roman & Peitz, Martin, 2008.
"Selling Service Plans to Differentially Informed Customers ,"
ZEW Discussion Papers
08-125, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
[Downloadable!]
Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran, 2005.
"Speculative Contracts ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5433, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Kalyan Chatterjee & R. Vijay Krishna, 2005.
"Menu Choice, Environmental Cues and Temptation: A “Dual Self” Approach to Self-control ,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
784828000000000576, David K. Levine.
[Downloadable!]
Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, 2006.
"Incentives and Self Control ,"
Levine's Bibliography
122247000000001262, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Edward Cartwright & Amrish Patel, 2008.
"Public Goods, Social Norms and Naive Beliefs ,"
Studies in Economics
0807, Department of Economics, University of Kent.
[Downloadable!]
Kfir Eliaz & Rani Spiegler, 2005.
"A Mechanism-Design Approach to Speculative Trade ,"
Levine's Bibliography
784828000000000429, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran, 2005.
"A Mechanism-Design Approach to Speculative Trade ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5434, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler, 2007.
"A Mechanism-Design Approach to Speculative Trade ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 75(3), pages 875-884, 05.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Gine, Xavier & Karlan, Dean & Zinman, Jonathan, 2009.
"Put your money where your butt is : a commitment contract for smoking cessation ,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
4985, The World Bank.
[Downloadable!]
Ran Spiegler, 2005.
"Competition over Agents with Boundedly Rational Expectations ,"
Levine's Bibliography
122247000000000535, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Nava Ashraf & James Berry & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2007.
"Can Higher Prices Stimulate Product Use? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Zambia ,"
NBER Working Papers
13247, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Stefano DellaVigna & Ulrike Malmendier, 2006.
"Paying Not to Go to the Gym ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 694-719, June.
[Downloadable!]
Access and
download statistics Did you know? Want to help out with this project? Look for volunteer opportunities .
This page was last updated on 2009-10-29.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .