Stage Financing and the Role of Convertible Debt

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Stage Financing and the Role of Convertible Debt

Author Info

Cornelli, Francesca
Yosha, Oved

Abstract

Venture capital financing is characterized by extensive use of convertible debt and stage financing. The paper shows why convertible debt is better than a simple mixture of debt and equity in stage financing situations. When the venture capitalist retains the option to abandon the project, the entrepreneur has an incentive to engage in ‘window dressing’ or short-termism, i.e. to bias positively the short-term performance of the project, in order to reduce the probability that the project will be liquidated. With a convertible debt contract, such behaviour reduces the likelihood of liquidation, but increases the probability that the venture capitalist will convert debt into equity, reducing the entrepreneur’s profits. With convertible debt, therefore, the entrepreneur will not engage in as much short-term behaviour in terms of signal manipulation in comparison to a situation where only straight debt-equity financing is used.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 1735.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Nov 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1735

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 53--56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820

Order Information:
Email:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Schmidt, Klaus M., 1999. "Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance," CEPR Discussion Papers 2317, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Schmidt, Klaus M., 1999. "Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
- Klaus M. Schmidt, 2003. "Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 1139-1166, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Christian Keuschnigg & Soren Nielsen, 2001. "Public Policy for Venture Capital," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 557-572, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Christian Keuschnigg & Søren Bo Nielsen, . "Public Policy for Venture Capital," EPRU Working Paper Series 01-06, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Christian Keuschnigg & Soren Bo Nielsen, 2001. "Public Policy for Venture Capital," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Carvalho, Antonio Gledson de & Calomiris, Charles W. & Matos, Joao Amaro de, 2005. "Venture capital as human resource management," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp470, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Antonio Geldson de Carvalho & Charles W. Calomiris & Joao Amaro de Matos, 2005. "Venture Capital as Human Resource Management," NBER Working Papers 11350, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- de Carvalho, Antonio Gledson & Calomiris, Charles W. & de Matos, João Amaro, 2008. "Venture capital as human resource management," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 223-255. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Andrea Schertler, 2000. "Venture Capital Contracts: A survey of the recent literature," Kiel Working Papers 1017, Kiel Institute for the World Economy. [Downloadable!]
Pia Weiß & Stefan Mai, 2002. "A Note on Firms' Strategic Behaviour During an IPO," IWP Discussion Paper Series 01/2002, Institute for Economic Policy, Cologne, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Pia Weiss, 2002. "A Note on Firms' Strategic Behaviour During an IPO," Microeconomics 0201003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Dewatripont, Mathias & Legros, Patrick & Matthews, Steven A, 2002. "Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics," CEPR Discussion Papers 3487, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 2002. "Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics," Penn CARESS Working Papers dfdfbbfe0a5b0e04217a58a93, Penn Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
- Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 2003. "Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-006, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
- Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 2003. "Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 890-930, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Hirukawa, Masayuki & Ueda, Masako, 2008. "Venture Capital and Innovation: Which is First?," CEPR Discussion Papers 7090, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bergemann, D. & Hege, U., 1997. "Venture capital financing, moral hazard, and learning," Discussion Paper 108, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Bergemann, Dirk & Hege, Ulrich, 1997. "Venture Capital Financing, Moral Hazard and Learning," CEPR Discussion Papers 1738, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Bergemann, Dirk & Hege, Ulrich, 1998. "Venture capital financing, moral hazard, and learning," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(6-8), pages 703-735, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Gebhardt, Georg & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2001. "Der Markt für Venture Capital: Anreizprobleme, Governance Strukturen und staatliche Interventionen," Discussion Papers in Economics 31, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Georg Gebhardt & Klaus M. Schmidt, 2002. "Der Markt für Venture Capital: Anreizprobleme, Governance Strukturen und staatliche Interventionen," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 3(3), pages 235-255, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Christian Keuschnigg & Soren Bo Nielsen, 2000. "Tax Policy, Venture Capital, and Entrepreneurship," NBER Working Papers 7976, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Christian Keuschnigg & Søren Bo Nielsen, . "Tax Policy, Venture Capital, and Entrepreneurship," EPRU Working Paper Series 00-18, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Keuschnigg, Christian & Nielsen, Soren Bo, 2000. "Tax Policy, Venture Capital and Entrepreneurship," CEPR Discussion Papers 2626, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Christian Keuschnigg & Soren Bo Nielsen, 2000. "Tax Policy, Venture Capital, and Entrepreneurship," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1848, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
- Keuschnigg, Christian & Nielsen, Soren Bo, 2003. "Tax policy, venture capital, and entrepreneurship," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 175-203, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Alan Hughes & Jaeho Lee, 2006. "What's in a name and when does it matter? The hot and cold market impacts on underpricing of certification, reputation and conflicts of interest in venture capital backed Korean IPOs," ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers wp336, ESRC Centre for Business Research. [Downloadable!]
Schertler, Andrea, 2001. "Venture Capital in Europe's Common Market: A Quantitative Description," EIFC - Technology and Finance Working Papers 4, United Nations University, Institute for New Technologies. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Andrea Schertler, 2001. "Venture Capital in Europe's Common Market: A Quantitative Description," Kiel Working Papers 1087, Kiel Institute for the World Economy. [Downloadable!]
Steven Matthews, 2002. "Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics (joint with Mathias Dewatripont and Patrick Legros) Note the special time," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000095, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, 2001. "The Venture Capital Revolution," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 145-168, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Giacinta CESTONE, 2001. "Venture Capital Meets Contract Theory: Risky Claims or Formal Control?," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 480.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Cestone, Giacinta, 2002. "Venture Capital Meets Contract Theory: Risky Claims or Formal Control?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3462, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Did you know? A tutorial is available.

This page was last updated on 2009-10-29.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.