This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Lobbying and the Structure of Protection

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Cadot, Olivier
de Melo, Jaime
Olarreaga, Marcelo

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper extends the influence-driven model of trade policy determination to include general equilibrium effects on the supply side resulting from labour-market interaction and intermediate goods. The model’s predictions for the structure of protection are related to underlying taste and technology parameters, and we derive analytically several propositions that are consistent with the stylized results of the empirical literature. Finally, numerical simulations are carried out for archetypal ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ economies. It turns out that the endogenously-determined structure of protection is broadly consistent with the observed pattern of protection in rich and poor economies, suggesting the usefulness of the approach.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP1574.asp
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 1574.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Feb 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1574

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 53--56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820

Order Information:
Email:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords: Endogenous Tariff; Political Economy;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Houda Haffoudhi, 2005. "Political-support lobbies responses to international environmental agreements," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques j05053, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1). [Downloadable!]
  2. Feizabadi, Yaser, 2007. "Political Tariff Protection in Iran`s agriculture sector," 106th Seminar, October 25-27, 2007, Montpellier, France 7922, European Association of Agricultural Economists. [Downloadable!]
  3. Conconi, P., 2000. "Green and Producer Lobbies: Enemies or Allies?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 570, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Grether, Jean-Marie & de Melo, Jaime & Olarreaga, Marcelo, 1999. "Who determines Mexican trade policy?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2187, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Giorgia Albertin, 2008. "Regionalism or Multilateralism? A Political Economy Choice," IMF Working Papers 08/65, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  6. Cadot, Olivier & de Melo, Jaime & Olarreaga, Marcelo, 2001. "Can duty-drawbacks have a protectionist bias? Evidence from MERCOSUR," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2523, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  7. Cadot, Olivier & de Melo, Jaime & Olarreaga, Marcelo, 2000. "The Protectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks and the New Regionalism," CEPR Discussion Papers 2559, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Houda Haffoudhi, 2005. "The logic of two-level games with endogenous lobbying : the case of international environmental agreements," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques j05054, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1). [Downloadable!]
  9. Belfrage, Carl-Johan, 2004. "Special Interest Politics and Trade Policy – An Empirical Challenge," Working Papers 2005:31, Lund University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Madani, Dorsati & Olarreaga, Marcelo, 2002. "Politically optimal tariffs : an application to Egypt," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2882, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? It is the publishers that input data about their publications, as there is no staff at RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-10-29.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.