An Economists Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning

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An Economists Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning

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Drew Fudenberg
David K Levine

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Drew Fudenberg

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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 784828000000000683.

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Date of creation: 05 Oct 2006
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:784828000000000683

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2006-10-14 (All new papers)
NEP-CBE-2006-10-14 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
NEP-CMP-2006-10-14 (Computational Economics)
NEP-KNM-2006-10-14 (Knowledge Management & Knowledge Economy)

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Jehiel, Philippe & Samet, Dov, 2005. "Learning to play games in extensive form by valuation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 124(2), pages 129-148, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Philippe Jehiel & Dov Samet, 2001. "Learning to play games in extensive form by valuation," Game Theory and Information 0012001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
- Philippe Jehiel & Dov Samet, 2001. "Learning To Play Games In Extensive Form By Valuation," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 391749000000000010, www.najecon.org. [Downloadable!]
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Other versions:
- Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1990. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 895, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
- Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1990. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 925, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1990. "Evolutionary Stability In Repeated Games Played By Finite Automata," Working papers 90-29, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
Other versions:
- Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1991. "Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Game Played by Finite Automata," Papers 9131, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1991. "Evolutionary Stability in Repeated games Played by Finite Automata," Papers 90-17, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1993. "Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 373, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1993. "Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 547-73, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Schlag, Karl H., 1994. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? Exploring a Model of Social Evolution," Discussion Paper Serie B 296, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Schlag, Karl H., 1998. "Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 130-156, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Hopkins, Ed, 1999. "Learning, Matching, and Aggregation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 79-110, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Ed Hopkins, . "Learning, Matching and Aggregation," Department of Economics 1996 : II, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
- Ed Hopkins, 1995. "Learning, Matching and Aggregation," Game Theory and Information 9512001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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Other versions:
- Fudenberg, D. & Kreps, D.M., 1992. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Working papers 92-13, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew, 1995. "Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(1), pages 93-125, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Borgers, Tilman & Sarin, Rajiv, 2000. "Naive Reinforcement Learning with Endogenous Aspirations," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(4), pages 921-50, November.

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