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Evolution and Information in a Gift Giving Game

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Author Info
Philip Johnson
David K. Levine
Wolfgang Pesendorfer

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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 162.

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Date of creation: 04 Jun 2000
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:162

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Morris, Stephen & Rob, Rafael & Shin, Hyun Song, 1995. "Dominance and Belief Potential," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 145-57, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. David K Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2000. "Evolution Through Imitation in a Single Population," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2122, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  2. Kevin Hasker, 2005. "Note: Using the Emergent Seed to Completely Characterize 'Evolution and Information in a Gift Giving Game'," Levine's Working Paper Archive 784828000000000142, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  3. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "Social Memory and Evidence from the Past," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000850, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Kevin Hasker, 2004. "The Emergent Seed : Simplifying the Analysis of Dynamic Evolution," Departmental Working Papers 0406, Bilkent University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Luca Anderlini (Georgetown University), Dino Gerardi (Yale University), Roger Lagunoff (Georgetown University), . "The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games," Working Papers gueconwpa~04-04-09, Georgetown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Max Albert & Werner Güth & Erich Kirchler & Boris Maciejovsky, 2007. "Are we nice(r) to nice(r) people?—An experimental analysis," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 53-69, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. David K Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2005. "Evolution of Cooperation Through Imitation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7630, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  8. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, . "A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games," Working Papers gueconwpa~06-06-01, Georgetown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Pedro Dal Bo & Guillaume R. Frechette, . "The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 2007-7, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "A `Super Folk Theorem' in Dynastic Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000926, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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