Altruism, Partner Choice, and Fixed-Cost Signalling

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Altruism, Partner Choice, and Fixed-Cost Signalling

Author Info

Andriy Zapechelnyuk
Ro’'i Zultan

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 122247000000002411.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 12 Oct 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000002411

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (David K. Levine).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Paper
- Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ro'i Zultan, 2008. "Altruism, Partner Choice, and Fixed-Cost Signaling," Discussion Paper Series dp483, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised Jul 2008. [Downloadable!]
- Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ro'i Zultan, 2008. "Altruism, Partner Choice, and Fixed-Cost Signalling," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000002199, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2008-10-21 (All new papers)
NEP-CTA-2008-10-21 (Contract Theory & Applications)
NEP-SOC-2008-10-21 (Social Norms & Social Capital)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey S., 2000. "Cheap Talk and Burned Money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 1-16, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks, 1998. "Cheap Talk and Burned Money," Discussion Papers 1245, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Nelson, Phillip, 1970. "Information and Consumer Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(2), pages 311-29, March-Apr. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Robert J. Aumann & Lloyd S. Shapley, 1992. "Long Term Competition-A Game Theoretic Analysis," UCLA Economics Working Papers 676, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Hirshlifer, David & Rassmusen, Eric, 1989. "Cooperation in a repeated prisoners' dilemma with ostracism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 87-106, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Friedman, James W, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(113), pages 1-12, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Eric Alden Smith & Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, 2000. "Costly Signaling and Cooperation," Working Papers 00-12-071, Santa Fe Institute.
Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1986. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 796-821, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Paul R. Milgrom & John Roberts, 1984. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 709, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Rubinstein, Ariel, 1979. "Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-9, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Data contributors to RePEc receive monthly emails with details about downloads and abstract views of their works.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-10.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.