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Sequential versus simultaneous contributions to public goods: Experimental evidence Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Simon Gaechter (University of Nottingham)
Daniele Nosenzo (University of Nottingham)
Elke Renner (University of Nottingham)
Martin Sefton () (University of Nottingham)
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We report an experiment comparing sequential and simultaneous contributions to a public good in a quasi-linear two-person setting (Varian, Journal of Public Economics, 1994). Our findings support the theoretical argument that sequential contributions result in lower overall provision than simultaneous contributions. However, the distribution of contributions is not as predicted: late contributors are sometimes willing to punish early low contributors by contributing less than their best response. This induces early contributors to contribute more than they otherwise would. A consequence of this is that we fail to observe a predicted first mover advantage.
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Paper provided by The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham in its series Discussion Papers with number
2009-07.
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Date of creation: Mar 2009Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2009-07Contact details of provider: Postal: University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD Phone: +44 (0) 115 951 5620 Fax: +44 (0) 115 951 4159 Web page: http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/cedex/ More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: Public Goods ; Voluntary Contributions ; Sequential Moves ; Experiment ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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