This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Potential Maximization and Coalition Government Formation

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Rod Garratt
Cheng-Zhong Qin

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.econ.ucsb.edu/papers/wp11-00.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara in its series University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series with number 11-00.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation:
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:11-00

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 2127 North Hall, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-9210
Phone: (805) 893-3670
Fax: (805) 893-8830
Web page: http://repositories.cdlib.org/ucsbecon/dwp/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Moldovanu, Benny, 1992. "Coalition-proof nash equilibria and the core in three-player games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 565-581, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Perry, Motty & Reny, Philip J, 1994. "A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 795-817, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Chatterjee, Kalyan & Bhaskar Dutta & Debraj Ray & Kunal Sengupta, 1993. "A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 60(2), pages 463-77, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey., 1987. "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes," Working Papers 643, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  5. Slikker, Marco & Dutta, Bhaskar & van den Nouweland, Anne & Tijs, Stef, 2000. "Potential maximizers and network formation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 55-70, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-64, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Claude, et al d'Aspremont, 1983. "On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Rod Garratt & Cheng-Zhong Qin, 2003. "On cooperation structures resulting from simultaneous proposals," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(5), pages 1-9. [Downloadable!]
  9. Rod Garratt & Cheng-Zhong Qin, 2003. "On potential maximization as a refinement of Nash equilibrium," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(12), pages 1-11. [Downloadable!]
  10. Stef Tijs & Anne van den Nouweland & Bhaskar Dutta, 1998. "Link formation in cooperative situations," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 245-256. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Slikker, Marco, 2001. "Coalition Formation and Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 436-448, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Roger B. Myerson, 1976. "Graphs and Cooperation in Games," Discussion Papers 246, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  13. Qin, Cheng-Zhong, 1996. "Endogenous Formation of Cooperation Structures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 218-226, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Bloch, Francis, 1996. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 90-123, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Rod Garratt & Cheng-Zhong Qin, 2003. "On cooperation structures resulting from simultaneous proposals," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(5), pages 1-9. [Downloadable!]
  2. Amegashie, J.A. & Cadsby, C.B. & Song, Y., 2005. "Competitive Burnout: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 2005-7, University of Guelph, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Anne van den Nouweland, 2004. "The Formation of Communication Networks in Cooperative Games," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2004-2, University of Oregon Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About five million pdf files are downloaded through RePEc every year.

This page was last updated on 2009-10-20.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.