This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Post-Issue Patent "Quality Control": A Comparative Study of US Patent Re-examinations and European Patent Oppositions

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Stuart Graham (University of California, Berkeley)
Bronwyn Hall (University of California, Berkeley & NBER,)
Dietmar Harhoff (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München & CEPR)
David Mowery (University of California, Berkeley & NBER)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We report the results of the first comparative study of the determinants and effects of patent oppositions in Europe and of re-examinations on corresponding patents issued in the United States. The analysis is based on a dataset consisting of matched EPO and US patents. Our analysis focuses on two broad technology categories - biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, and semiconductors and computer software. Within these fields, we collect data on all EPO patents for which oppositions were filed at the EPO. We also construct a random sample of EPO patents with no opposition in these technologies. We match these EPO patents with the "equivalent" US patents covering the same invention in the United States. Using the matched sample of USPTO and EPO patents, we compare the determinants of opposition and of reexamination. Our results indicate that valuable patents are more likely to be challenged in both jurisdictions. But the rate of opposition at the EPO is more than thirty times higher than the rate of reexamination at the USPTO. Moreover, opposition leads to a revocation of the patent in about 41 percent of the cases, and to a restriction of the patent right in another 30 percent of the cases. Re-examination results in a cancellation of the patent right in only 12.2 percent of all cases. We also find that reexamination is frequently initiated by the patentholders themselves.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1046&context=iber/econ
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley in its series Department of Economics, Working Paper Series with number 1046.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 01 Aug 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cdl:econwp:1046

Note: oai:cdlib1:iber/econ-1046
Contact details of provider:
Postal: F502 Haas, Berkeley CA 94720-1922
Phone: (510) 642-1922
Fax: (510) 642-5018
Email:
Web page: http://repositories.cdlib.org/iber/econ/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords: patent system litigation intellectual property opposition re-examination

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1984. "Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 404-415, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Richard C. Levin & Alvin K. Klevorick & Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, 1987. "Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 18(1987-3), pages 783-832. [Downloadable!]
  3. Richard C. Levin & Alvin K. Klevorick & Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, 1988. "Appropriating the Returns from Industrial R&D," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 862, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  4. Teece, David J., 1986. "Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 15(6), pages 285-305, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Jean O. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, 1996. "Preliminary Injunctive Relief: Theory and Evidence from Patent Litigation," NBER Working Papers 5689, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Robert M. Hunt, 2001. "You can patent that? Are patents on computer programs and business methods good for the new economy?," Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, issue Q1, pages 5-15. [Downloadable!]
  7. F. M. Scherer, 1965. "Corporate Inventive Output, Profits, and Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 290. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Harhoff, Dietmar & Reitzig, Markus, 2002. "Determinants of Opposition Against EPO Patent Grants - The Case of Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals," CEPR Discussion Papers 3645, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Kortum, Samuel & Lerner, Josh, 1999. "What is behind the recent surge in patenting?1," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 1-22, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Lanjouw, Jean O & Schankerman, Mark, 2001. "Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights," CEPR Discussion Papers 3093, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Graham, Stuart J.H. & Harhoff, Dietmar, 2006. "Can Post-Grant Reviews Improve Patent System Design? A Twin Study of US and European Patents," CEPR Discussion Papers 5680, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Jean Olson Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, 2001. "Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights," STICERD - Economics of Industry Papers 30, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  4. Nicolas van Zeebroeck, 2008. "Développement et impact des stratégies de dépôt de brevets," Working Papers CEB 08-041.RS, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Solvay Business School, Centre Emile Bernheim (CEB). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Blind, Knut & Cremers, Katrin & Mueller, Elisabeth, 2007. "The Influence of Strategic Patenting on Companies’ Patent Portfolios," ZEW Discussion Papers 07-013, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  6. Nicolas van Zeebroeck, 2007. "The puzzle of patent value indicators," Working Papers CEB 07-023.RS, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Solvay Business School, Centre Emile Bernheim (CEB). [Downloadable!]
  7. David Popp & Ted Juhl & Daniel Johnson, 2004. "Time In Purgatory: Examining the Grant Lag for U.S. Patent Applications," Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 4(1), pages 1329-1329. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Nicolas van Zeebroeck, 2007. "Patents only live twice: a patent survival analysis in Europe," Working Papers CEB 07-028.RS, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Solvay Business School, Centre Emile Bernheim (CEB). [Downloadable!]
  9. Stuart Graham & David Mowrey, 2004. "Submarines in software? continuations in US software patenting in the 1980s and 1990s," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 13(5), pages 443-456, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Jean Olson Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, 2001. "Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights," NBER Working Papers 8656, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Michele Cincera, 2008. "Déterminants des oppositions de brevets:une analyse micro-économique au niveau belge," Working Papers DULBEA 08-02.RS, Université libre de Bruxelles, Department of Applied Economics (DULBEA). [Downloadable!]
  12. Adam Jaffe & Josh Lerner, 2007. "Innovation and Its Discontents," Capitalism and Society, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 1(3), pages 3. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Bronwyn H. Hall, 2009. "Business and Financial Method Patents, Innovation, and Policy," NBER Working Papers 14868, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Alfons Palangkaraya & Paul H. Jensen & Elizabeth Webster, 2005. "Determinants of International Patent Examination Outcomes," Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series wp2005n06, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS also indexes book chapters.

This page was last updated on 2009-6-12.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.