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On the Evolution of Imitative Behavior

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Author Info
Björnerstedt, Jonas
Karl H. Schlag

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Abstract

We analyze the evolution of behavioral rules for learning how to play a two-armed bandit. Individuals have no information about the underlying pay-off distributions and have limited memory about their own past experience. Instead they must rely on information obtained trough observing the performance of other individuals. Evolution is modelled using the replicator dynamic with the revision behaviors as replicators. We find that evolution favors a special class of imitative rules. These so-called strictly improving rules, that also play an important role in a bounded rational selection approach (Schlag [16]), are found to be neutrally stable when facing any two-armed bandit.

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File URL: ftp://web.bgse.uni-bonn.de/pub/RePEc/bon/bonsfb/bonsfb378.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie B with number 378.

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Date of creation: Jul 1996
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Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:378

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Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
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Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de/index.php?id=517

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Related research
Keywords: multi-armed bandit; social learning; payoff increasing; improving; proportional imitation rule; replicator dynamic; neutral stability; survival;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Bjornerstedt, J. & Weibull, J.W., 1993. "Nash Equilibrium and Evolution by Imitation," DELTA Working Papers 93-23, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  2. Schlag, Karl H., 1998. "Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 130-156, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Dekel, Eddie & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1992. "On the evolution of optimizing behavior," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 392-406, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Karl H. Schlag, 1995. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Bounded Rational Approach to Multi-Armed Bandits," Discussion Paper Serie B 361, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Mar 1996. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1999. "Markets under bounded rationality: from theory to facts," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 23(1), pages 3-26, January. [Downloadable!]
  3. Droste, E. & Tuinstra, J., 1998. "Evolutionary selection of behavioral rules in a Cournot model : a local bifurcation analysis," Discussion Paper 86, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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