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Makoto Shimoji

(deceased)

Personal Details

This person is deceased (Date: 10 Jun 2023)
First Name:Makoto
Middle Name:
Last Name:Shimoji
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:psh455
Terminal Degree: Department of Economics; University of California-San Diego (UCSD) (from RePEc Genealogy)

Research output

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Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Inacio Bo & Jorgen Kratz & Makoto Shimoji, 2021. "Generalized Cumulative Offer Processes," Discussion Papers 21/07, Department of Economics, University of York.
  2. Makoto Shimoji, 2016. "Rationalizable Persuasion," Discussion Papers 16/08, Department of Economics, University of York.
  3. Makoto Shimoji, 2014. "Revenue Comparison of Discrete Private-Value Auctions via Weak Dominance," Discussion Papers 14/13, Department of Economics, University of York.
  4. Makoto Shimoji & Paul Schweinzer, 2012. "Implementation without Incentive Compatibility: Two Stories with Partially Informed Planners," Discussion Papers 12/21, Department of Economics, University of York.
  5. Abbigail J. Chiodo & Massimo Guidolin & Michael T. Owyang & Makoto Shimoji, 2003. "Subjective probabilities: psychological evidence and economic applications," Working Papers 2003-009, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  6. Paul Schweinzer & Makoto Shimoji, "undated". "Captain MacWhirr's Problem Revisited," Discussion Papers 11/12, Department of Economics, University of York.
  7. Jack Robles & Makoto Shimoji, "undated". "On Rationalizable Outcomes in Private-Value First-Price Discrete Auctions," Discussion Papers 09/21, Department of Economics, University of York.

Articles

  1. Makoto Shimoji, 2023. "Setting an exam as an information design problem," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 19(3), pages 559-579, September.
  2. Makoto Shimoji, 2022. "Bayesian persuasion in unlinked games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(3), pages 451-481, November.
  3. Makoto Shimoji, 2017. "Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(4), pages 231-252, December.
  4. Miguel A. Costa‐Gomes & Makoto Shimoji, 2015. "A Comment on “Can Relaxation of Beliefs Rationalize the Winner's Curse?: An Experimental Study”," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83, pages 375-383, January.
  5. Shimoji, Makoto & Schweinzer, Paul, 2015. "Implementation without incentive compatibility: Two stories with partially informed planners," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 258-267.
  6. Costa-Gomes, Miguel A. & Shimoji, Makoto, 2014. "Theoretical approaches to lowest unique bid auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 16-24.
  7. Shimoji, Makoto, 2012. "Outcome-equivalence of self-confirming equilibrium and Nash equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 441-447.
  8. Robles Jack & Shimoji Makoto, 2012. "On Rationalizability and Beliefs in Discrete Private-Value First-Price Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-21, May.
  9. Shimoji, Makoto, 2004. "On the equivalence of weak dominance and sequential best response," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 385-402, August.
  10. Abbigail J. Chiodo & Massimo Guidolin & Michael T. Owyang & Makoto Shimoji, 2004. "Subjective probabilities: psychological theories and economic applications," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 86(Jan), pages 33-48.
  11. Makoto Shimoji, 2002. "On forward induction in money-burning games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 19(3), pages 637-648.
  12. Shimoji, Makoto & Watson, Joel, 1998. "Conditional Dominance, Rationalizability, and Game Forms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 161-195, December.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Makoto Shimoji, 2016. "Rationalizable Persuasion," Discussion Papers 16/08, Department of Economics, University of York.

    Cited by:

    1. Makoto Shimoji, 2022. "Bayesian persuasion in unlinked games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(3), pages 451-481, November.
    2. Chan, Jimmy & Gupta, Seher & Li, Fei & Wang, Yun, 2019. "Pivotal persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 178-202.
      • Jimmy Chan & Seher Gupta & Fei Li & Yun Wang, 2018. "Pivotal Persuasion," Working Papers 2018-11-03, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University.

  2. Makoto Shimoji, 2014. "Revenue Comparison of Discrete Private-Value Auctions via Weak Dominance," Discussion Papers 14/13, Department of Economics, University of York.

    Cited by:

    1. Takumi Kongo, 2020. "Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 24(3), pages 199-213, December.

  3. Makoto Shimoji & Paul Schweinzer, 2012. "Implementation without Incentive Compatibility: Two Stories with Partially Informed Planners," Discussion Papers 12/21, Department of Economics, University of York.

    Cited by:

    1. Ville Korpela, 2014. "Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(3), pages 647-658, October.
    2. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Andrea Prestipino, 2011. "Transparent Restrictions on Beliefs and Forward Induction Reasoning in Games with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 376, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.

Articles

  1. Makoto Shimoji, 2022. "Bayesian persuasion in unlinked games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(3), pages 451-481, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Makoto Shimoji, 2023. "Setting an exam as an information design problem," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 19(3), pages 559-579, September.

  2. Makoto Shimoji, 2017. "Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(4), pages 231-252, December.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Miguel A. Costa‐Gomes & Makoto Shimoji, 2015. "A Comment on “Can Relaxation of Beliefs Rationalize the Winner's Curse?: An Experimental Study”," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83, pages 375-383, January.

    Cited by:

    1. Vincent P. Crawford & Miguel A. Costa-Gomes & Nagore Iriberri, 2013. "Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 51(1), pages 5-62, March.
    2. Makoto Shimoji, 2017. "Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(4), pages 231-252, December.
    3. Itzhak Rasooly, 2021. "Going... going... wrong: a test of the level-k (and cognitive hierarchy) models of bidding behaviour," Papers 2111.05686, arXiv.org.
    4. Johannes Moser, 2019. "Hypothetical thinking and the winner’s curse: an experimental investigation," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 87(1), pages 17-56, July.
    5. Moser, Johannes, 2018. "Hypothetical thinking and the winner's curse: An experimental investigation," VfS Annual Conference 2018 (Freiburg, Breisgau): Digital Economy 181506, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    6. Itzhak Rasooly, 2022. "Going...going...wrong: a test of the level-k (and cognitive hierarchy) models of bidding behaviour," Economics Series Working Papers 959, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    7. Johannes Moser, 2017. "Hypothetical thinking and the winner's curse: An experimental investigation," Working Papers 176, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).
    8. Moser, Johannes, 2017. "Hypothetical thinking and the winner's curse: An experimental investigation," University of Regensburg Working Papers in Business, Economics and Management Information Systems 36304, University of Regensburg, Department of Economics.
    9. Vincent P. Crawford & Miguel A. Costa-Gomes & Nagore Iriberri, 2010. "Strategic Thinking," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000001148, David K. Levine.
    10. Camerer, Colin & Nunnari, Salvatore & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2016. "Quantal response and nonequilibrium beliefs explain overbidding in maximum-value auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 243-263.
    11. Koch, Christian & Penczynski, Stefan P., 2018. "The winner's curse: Conditional reasoning and belief formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 57-102.

  4. Shimoji, Makoto & Schweinzer, Paul, 2015. "Implementation without incentive compatibility: Two stories with partially informed planners," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 258-267.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Costa-Gomes, Miguel A. & Shimoji, Makoto, 2014. "Theoretical approaches to lowest unique bid auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 16-24.

    Cited by:

    1. Mohlin, Erik & Östling, Robert & Wang, Joseph Tao-yi, 2015. "Lowest unique bid auctions with population uncertainty," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 53-57.
    2. Takashi Yamada & Nobuyuki Hanaki, 2015. "An Experiment on Lowest Unique Integer Games," GREDEG Working Papers 2015-34, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    3. Erik Mohlin & Robert Ostling & Joseph Tao-yi Wang, 2014. "Learning by Imitation in Games: Theory, Field, and Laboratory," Economics Series Working Papers 734, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    4. Mohlin, Erik & Östling, Robert & Wang, Joseph Tao-yi, 2020. "Learning by similarity-weighted imitation in winner-takes-all games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 225-245.

  6. Shimoji, Makoto, 2012. "Outcome-equivalence of self-confirming equilibrium and Nash equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 441-447.

    Cited by:

    1. Schipper, Burkhard C, 2018. "Discovery and Equilibrium in Games with Unawareness," MPRA Paper 86300, University Library of Munich, Germany.

  7. Robles Jack & Shimoji Makoto, 2012. "On Rationalizability and Beliefs in Discrete Private-Value First-Price Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-21, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Bernhard Kasberger & Karl H. Schlag, 2017. "Robust Bidding in First-Price Auctions: How to Bid without Knowing what Otheres are Doing," Vienna Economics Papers vie1707, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    2. Makoto Shimoji, 2017. "Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(4), pages 231-252, December.
    3. Makoto Shimoji & Paul Schweinzer, 2012. "Implementation without Incentive Compatibility: Two Stories with Partially Informed Planners," Discussion Papers 12/21, Department of Economics, University of York.

  8. Shimoji, Makoto, 2004. "On the equivalence of weak dominance and sequential best response," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 385-402, August.

    Cited by:

    1. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & De Vito, Nicodemo, 2021. "Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 195(C).
    2. Makoto Shimoji, 2016. "Rationalizable Persuasion," Discussion Papers 16/08, Department of Economics, University of York.
    3. , & ,, 2013. "The order independence of iterated dominance in extensive games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
    4. Battigalli, P. & Catonini, E. & Manili, J., 2023. "Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 527-551.
    5. Catonini, Emiliano, 2019. "Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 101-117.
    6. Xiao Luo & Xuewen Qian & Yang Sun, 2021. "The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(2), pages 579-601, March.

  9. Abbigail J. Chiodo & Massimo Guidolin & Michael T. Owyang & Makoto Shimoji, 2004. "Subjective probabilities: psychological theories and economic applications," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 86(Jan), pages 33-48.

    Cited by:

    1. Berlemann, Michael, 2016. "Does hurricane risk affect individual well-being? Empirical evidence on the indirect effects of natural disasters," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 99-113.

  10. Makoto Shimoji, 2002. "On forward induction in money-burning games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 19(3), pages 637-648.

    Cited by:

    1. Souza, Filipe & Rêgo, Leandro, 2012. "Mixed Equilibrium: When Burning Money is Rational," MPRA Paper 43410, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Shimoji, Makoto, 2004. "On the equivalence of weak dominance and sequential best response," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 385-402, August.

  11. Shimoji, Makoto & Watson, Joel, 1998. "Conditional Dominance, Rationalizability, and Game Forms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 161-195, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Andrés Perea & Elias Tsakas, 2019. "Limited focus in dynamic games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(2), pages 571-607, June.
    2. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2021. "Social Rationalizability with Mediation," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2021017, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & De Vito, Nicodemo, 2021. "Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 195(C).
    4. Kool, C.J.M. & Thornton, D., 2000. "The expectations theory and the founding of the fed: another look at the evidence," Research Memorandum 009, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    5. Crawford, Vincent P., 2001. "Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt6k65014s, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    6. Luo, Xiao & Yang, Chih-Chun, 2009. "Bayesian coalitional rationalizability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 248-263, January.
    7. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Gabriele Beneduci & Pietro Tebaldi, 2017. "Interactive Epistemology in Simple Dynamic Games with a Continuum of Strategies," Working Papers 602, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    8. Yildiz, Muhamet, 2003. "Walrasian bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 465-487, November.
    9. Makoto Shimoji, 2016. "Rationalizable Persuasion," Discussion Papers 16/08, Department of Economics, University of York.
    10. Zuazo Garín, Peio, 2014. "Uncertain Information Structures and Backward Induction," IKERLANAK 12097, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    11. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Corrao, Roberto & Sanna, Federico, 2020. "Epistemic game theory without types structures: An application to psychological games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 28-57.
    12. Yang, Chih-Chun, 2018. "Perfect forward induction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 113-116.
    13. Shengwu Li, 2017. "Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(11), pages 3257-3287, November.
    14. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., 2004. "Rationalizability for social environments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 135-156, October.
    15. Burkhard Schipper & Hee Yeul Woo, 2014. "Political Awareness, Microtargeting of Voters, and Negative Electoral Campaigning," Working Papers 185, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    16. Burkhard Schipper & Martin Meier & Aviad Heifetz, 2011. "Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior," Working Papers 315, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    17. Andrew MACKENZIE & Yu ZHOU, 2020. "Menu Mechanisms," Discussion papers e-19-012, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.
    18. Burkhard Schipper & Martin Meier & Aviad Heifetz, 2011. "Prudent Rationalizability in Generalized Extensive-Form Games," Working Papers 287, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    19. Shuo Liu & Harry Pei, 2017. "Monotone equilibria in signalling games," ECON - Working Papers 252, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    20. Burkhard C. Schipper & Martin Meier & Aviad Heifetz, 2019. "Prudent Rationalizability in Generalized Extensive-Form Games with Unawareness," Working Papers 332, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    21. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 2003. "Rationalizability in infinite, dynamic games with incomplete information," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 1-38, March.
    22. Martin Meier & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2022. "Conditional dominance in games with unawareness," Working Papers 351, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    23. Eran Hanany & Peter Klibanoff & Sujoy Mukerji, 2020. "Incomplete Information Games with Ambiguity Averse Players," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(2), pages 135-187, May.
    24. Shimoji, Makoto, 2004. "On the equivalence of weak dominance and sequential best response," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 385-402, August.
    25. Bonanno, Giacomo, 2014. "A doxastic behavioral characterization of generalized backward induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 221-241.
    26. Burkhard Schipper & Ying Xue Li, 2018. "Strategic Reasoning in Persuasion Games: An Experiment," Working Papers 111, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    27. Chen, Yi-Chun, 2012. "A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 587-597.
    28. Giacomo Bonanno & Pierpaolo Battigalli, 2003. "Recent Results On Belief, Knowledge And The Epistemic Foundations Of Game Theory," Working Papers 266, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    29. Marek Pycia & Peter Troyan, 2021. "A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design," ECON - Working Papers 393, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    30. , & ,, 2013. "The order independence of iterated dominance in extensive games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
    31. Burkhard Schipper & Hee Yeul Woo, 2012. "Political Awareness and Microtargeting of Voters in Electoral Competition," Working Papers 46, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    32. Burkhard C. Schipper & Hang Zhou, 2022. "Level-k Thinking in the Extensive Form," Working Papers 352, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    33. Brandenburger, Adam & Friedenberg, Amanda, 2010. "Self-admissible sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 785-811, March.
    34. Makoto Shimoji, 2022. "Bayesian persuasion in unlinked games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(3), pages 451-481, November.
    35. Giacomo Bonanno, 2013. "An epistemic characterization of generalized backward induction," Working Papers 60, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    36. Perea, Andrés, 2018. "Why forward induction leads to the backward induction outcome: A new proof for Battigalli's theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 120-138.
    37. Liu, Shuo & Pei, Harry, 2020. "Monotone equilibria in signaling games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
    38. Ye Jin, 2021. "Does level-k behavior imply level-k thinking?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(1), pages 330-353, March.
    39. Catonini, Emiliano, 2020. "On non-monotonic strategic reasoning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 209-224.
    40. Rich, Patricia, 2015. "Rethinking common belief, revision, and backward induction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 102-114.
    41. Isogai, Shigeki & Shen, Chaohai, 2023. "Multiproduct firm’s reputation and leniency program in multimarket collusion," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 125(C).
    42. Perea, Andrés, 2017. "Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 489-516.
    43. J. J. Herings & A. Mauleon & V. Vannetelbosch, 2000. "Social Rationalizability," THEMA Working Papers 2000-36, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    44. Perea, Andrés, 2014. "Belief in the opponentsʼ future rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 231-254.
    45. Man, Priscilla T.Y., 2012. "Forward induction equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 265-276.
    46. Goossens, J.H.M. & van Hoesel, C.P.M. & Kroon, L.G., 2002. "On solving multi-type line planning problems," Research Memorandum 009, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    47. Jing Chen & Silvio Micali, 2016. "Leveraging Possibilistic Beliefs in Unrestricted Combinatorial Auctions," Games, MDPI, vol. 7(4), pages 1-19, October.
    48. Licun Xue, "undated". "A Notion of Consistent Rationalizability - Between Weak and Pearce's Extensive Form Rationalizability," Economics Working Papers 2000-4, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    49. Awaya, Yu & Iwasaki, Kohei & Watanabe, Makoto, 2022. "Rational bubbles and middlemen," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(4), November.
    50. Mario Gilli, 2002. "Iterated Admissibility as Solution Concept in Game Theory," Working Papers 47, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2002.
    51. Müller, Christoph, 2016. "Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 407-450.
    52. Aviad Heifetz & Andrés Perea, 2015. "On the outcome equivalence of backward induction and extensive form rationalizability," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(1), pages 37-59, February.
    53. Arora, Gaurav & Feng, Hongli & Hennessy, David A. & Loesch, Charles R. & Kvas, Susan, 2021. "The impact of production network economies on spatially-contiguous conservation– Theoretical model with evidence from the U.S. Prairie Pothole Region," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 4 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (3) 2012-08-23 2014-08-09 2021-10-18
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (3) 2012-08-23 2014-08-09 2016-07-30
  3. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2012-08-23
  4. NEP-DES: Economic Design (1) 2021-10-18
  5. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2016-07-30
  6. NEP-HPE: History and Philosophy of Economics (1) 2016-07-30
  7. NEP-ORE: Operations Research (1) 2021-10-18

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