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Daniel Monte

Personal Details

First Name:Daniel
Middle Name:
Last Name:Monte
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pmo511
https://sites.google.com/site/dma33danielmonte/
Rua Itapeva, 474- 10° andar Bela Vista, CEP 01332-000 Sao Paulo, Brazil
+55 11 3799-3727

Affiliation

Escola de Economia de São Paulo (EESP)
Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV)

São Paulo, Brazil
http://economics-sp.fgv.br/
RePEc:edi:eegvfbr (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Daniel Monte & Roberto Pinheiro, 2020. "Oligopsonies over the Business Cycle," Working Papers 20-06, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  2. Daniel Monte & Roberto Pinheiro, 2017. "Costly Information Intermediation as a Natural Monopoly," Working Papers (Old Series) 1721, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  3. Daniel Monte & Norovsambuu Tumennasan, 2012. "Matching with Quorums," Economics Working Papers 2012-10, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
  4. Daniel Monte & Norovsambuu Tumennasan, 2012. "Centralized Allocation in Multiple Markets," Economics Working Papers 2012-09, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
  5. John Kennes & Daniel Monte & Norovsambuu Tumennasan, 2011. "The Daycare Assignment Problem," Economics Working Papers 2011-05, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
  6. Monte, Daniel & Said, Maher, 2010. "Learning in hidden Markov models with bounded memory," MPRA Paper 23854, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 23 Jun 2010.

Articles

  1. John Kennes Jr. & Daniel Monte Jr. & Norovsambuu Tumennasan Jr., 2014. "The Day Care Assignment: A Dynamic Matching Problem," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 362-406, November.
  2. Daniel Monte & Maher Said, 2014. "The value of (bounded) memory in a changing world," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(1), pages 59-82, May.
  3. Monte, Daniel, 2014. "Learning with bounded memory in games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 204-223.
  4. Daniel Monte, 2014. "Incentive constraints in games with bounded memory," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(1), pages 137-143, February.
  5. Monte, Daniel, 2013. "Bounded memory and permanent reputations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 345-354.
  6. Monte, Daniel & Tumennasan, Norovsambuu, 2013. "Matching with quorums," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(1), pages 14-17.
  7. Monte Daniel, 2010. "A Theory of Credibility under Commitment," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-15, July.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. John Kennes & Daniel Monte & Norovsambuu Tumennasan, 2011. "The Daycare Assignment Problem," Economics Working Papers 2011-05, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.

    Mentioned in:

    1. The daycare assignment problem
      by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2011-06-16 19:20:00

Working papers

  1. Daniel Monte & Norovsambuu Tumennasan, 2012. "Matching with Quorums," Economics Working Papers 2012-10, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.

    Cited by:

    1. Katarina Cechlarova & Bettina Klaus & David F.Manlove, 2018. "Pareto optimal matchings of students to courses in the presence of prerequisites," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 16.04, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    2. William Thomson, 2018. "On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 22(1), pages 67-99, June.
    3. Cechlárová, Katarína & Fleiner, Tamás, 2017. "Pareto optimal matchings with lower quotas," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 3-10.
    4. Klijn Flip, 2019. "Constrained Allocation of Projects to Heterogeneous Workers with Preferences over Peers," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 19(1), pages 1-9, January.
    5. Madhav Raghavan, 2017. "Serial Priority in Project Allocation: A Characterisation," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 17.17, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    6. Ashwin Arulselvan & Agnes Cseh & Martin Groß & David F. Manlove & Jannik Matuschke, 2017. "Matchings with lower quotas: Algorithms and complexity," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1724, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    7. Andreas Darmann & Janosch Döcker & Britta Dorn & Sebastian Schneckenburger, 2022. "Simplified group activity selection with group size constraints," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(1), pages 169-212, March.
    8. Goto, Masahiro & Iwasaki, Atsushi & Kawasaki, Yujiro & Yasuda, Yosuke & Yokoo, Makoto, 2014. "Improving Fairness and Efficiency in Matching with Distributional Constraints: An Alternative Solution for the Japanese Medical Residency Match," MPRA Paper 53409, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Marek Bojko, 2020. "The Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms with Minimum Quotas," Papers 2012.11028, arXiv.org.

  2. Daniel Monte & Norovsambuu Tumennasan, 2012. "Centralized Allocation in Multiple Markets," Economics Working Papers 2012-09, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.

    Cited by:

    1. Gian Caspari, 2023. "A market design solution to a multi-category housing allocation problem," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 8(1), pages 75-96, December.
    2. John Kennes & Daniel Monte & Norovsambuu Tumennasan, 2015. "Dynamic Matching Markets and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism," Economics Working Papers 2015-23, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    3. Di Feng & Bettina Klaus, 2022. "Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 18(1), pages 61-76, March.
    4. Honda, Edward, 2021. "A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for conditionally lexicographic-substitutable preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    5. Anno, Hidekazu & Kurino, Morimitsu, 2016. "On the operation of multiple matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 166-185.
    6. Di Feng & Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2022. "A Characterization of the Coordinate-Wise Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Multiple-Type Housing Markets," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 22.06, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    7. Di Feng & Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2022. "Characterizing the Typewise Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Multiple-Type Housing Markets," Working Papers 1341, Barcelona School of Economics.
    8. Di Feng, 2023. "Efficiency in Multiple-Type Housing Markets," Papers 2308.14989, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2023.
    9. Yasushi Kawase & Hanna Sumita & Yu Yokoi, 2022. "Random Assignment of Indivisible Goods under Constraints," Papers 2208.07666, arXiv.org.
    10. Manjunath, Vikram & Westkamp, Alexander, 2021. "Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).

  3. John Kennes & Daniel Monte & Norovsambuu Tumennasan, 2011. "The Daycare Assignment Problem," Economics Working Papers 2011-05, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.

    Cited by:

    1. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Thayer Morrill, 2014. "Sequential Kidney Exchange," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 265-285, August.
    2. Monte, Daniel & Tumennasan, Norovsambuu, 2015. "Centralized allocation in multiple markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 74-85.
    3. John Kennes Jr. & Daniel Monte Jr. & Norovsambuu Tumennasan Jr., 2014. "The Day Care Assignment: A Dynamic Matching Problem," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 362-406, November.

  4. Monte, Daniel & Said, Maher, 2010. "Learning in hidden Markov models with bounded memory," MPRA Paper 23854, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 23 Jun 2010.

    Cited by:

    1. Chatterjee, Kalyan & Guryev, Konstantin & Hu, Tai-Wei, 2022. "Bounded memory in a changing world: Biases in behaviour and belief," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
    2. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Nick Netzer, 2015. "Robust stochastic stability," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(1), pages 31-57, January.
    3. Leung, B. T. K., 2020. "Learning in a Small/Big World," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2085, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    4. Benson Tsz Kin Leung, 2020. "Learning in a Small/Big World," Papers 2009.11917, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2023.
    5. Mueller-Frank, Manuel, 2015. "Reaching Consensus in Social Networks," IESE Research Papers D/1116, IESE Business School.
    6. Tai-Wei Hu, 2023. "Forgetful updating and stubborn decision-makers," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(3), pages 781-802, April.

Articles

  1. John Kennes Jr. & Daniel Monte Jr. & Norovsambuu Tumennasan Jr., 2014. "The Day Care Assignment: A Dynamic Matching Problem," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 362-406, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Kadam, Sangram V. & Kotowski, Maciej H., 2015. "Time Horizons, Lattice Structures, and Welfare in Multi-period Matching Markets," Working Paper Series rwp15-031, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    2. Kotowski, Maciej H., 2015. "A Note on Stability in One-to-One, Multi-period Matching Markets," Working Paper Series rwp15-042, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    3. Yasunori Okumura, 2019. "School Choice with General Constraints: A Market Design Approach for the Nursery School Waiting List Problem in Japan," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 70(4), pages 497-516, December.
    4. John Kennes & Daniel Monte & Norovsambuu Tumennasan, 2015. "Dynamic Matching Markets and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism," Economics Working Papers 2015-23, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    5. Francis Bloch & David Cantala, 2014. "Dynamic Allocation of Objects to Queuing Agents: The Discrete Model," Post-Print halshs-01109667, HAL.
    6. Schummer, James, 2021. "Influencing waiting lists," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 195(C).
    7. Morimitsu Kurino, 2020. "Credibility, efficiency, and stability: a theory of dynamic matching markets," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 71(1), pages 135-165, January.
    8. Fragiadakis, Daniel & Troyan, Peter, 2017. "Improving matching under hard distributional constraints," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
    9. Xinsheng Xiong & Yong Zhao & Yang Chen, 2017. "A computational approach to the multi-period many-to-one matching with ties," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 183-201, January.
    10. Dimakopoulos, Philipp D. & Heller, C.-Philipp, 2018. "Matching with Waiting Times: The German Entry-Level Labor Market for Lawyers," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 68, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    11. Haeringer, Guillaume & Iehlé, Vincent, 2021. "Gradual college admission," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    12. Francis Bloch & David Cantala, 2017. "Dynamic Assignment of Objects to Queuing Agents," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 88-122, February.
    13. Dimakopoulos, Philipp D. & Heller, C.-Philipp, 2015. "Matching with Waiting Times: The German Entry-Level Labour Market for Lawyers," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113153, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    14. Philipp D. Dimakopoulos & Christian-Philipp Heller, "undated". "Matching with Waiting Times: The German Entry-Level Labour Market for Lawyers," BDPEMS Working Papers 2014005, Berlin School of Economics.
    15. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Thayer Morrill, 2014. "Sequential Kidney Exchange," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 265-285, August.
    16. Nick Arnosti & Peng Shi, 2020. "Design of Lotteries and Wait-Lists for Affordable Housing Allocation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(6), pages 2291-2307, June.
    17. Tobias Reischmann & Thilo Klein & Sven Giegerich, 2021. "A deferred acceptance mechanism for decentralized, fast, and fair childcare assignment," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 6(1), pages 59-100, December.
    18. Batsaikhan, Mongoljin & Gørtz, Mette & Kennes, John & Lyng, Ran Sun & Monte, Daniel & Tumennasan, Norovsambuu, 2021. "Discrimination and Daycare Choice: Evidence from a Randomized Survey," IZA Discussion Papers 14874, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    19. Mongoljin Batsaikhan & Mette Gørtz & John Kennes & Ran Sun Lyng & Daniel Monte & Norovsambuu Tumennasan, 2019. "Daycare Choice and Ethnic Diversity: Evidence from a Randomized Survey," Economics Working Papers 2019-02, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    20. Monte, Daniel & Tumennasan, Norovsambuu, 2015. "Centralized allocation in multiple markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 74-85.
    21. Anno, Hidekazu & Kurino, Morimitsu, 2016. "On the operation of multiple matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 166-185.
    22. André Veski & Péter Biró & Kaire Põder & Triin Lauri, 2017. "Efficiency and fair access in Kindergarten allocation policy design," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 2(1), pages 57-104, December.
    23. Reischmann, Tobias & Klein, Thilo & Giegerich, Sven, 2021. "An iterative deferred acceptance mechanism for decentralized, fast and fair childcare assignment," ZEW Discussion Papers 21-095, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    24. Dimakopoulos, Philipp D. & Heller, C.-Philipp, 2019. "Matching with waiting times: The German entry-level labor market for lawyers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 289-313.
    25. Tommy ANDERSSON & Lars EHLERS & Alessandro MARTINELLO, 2018. "Dynamic Refugee Matching," Cahiers de recherche 22-2018, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    26. Ata Atay & Antonio Romero-Medina, 2023. "Complementarities in childcare allocation under priorities," Papers 2308.14689, arXiv.org.
    27. Kotowski, Maciej, 2019. "A Perfectly Robust Approach to Multiperiod Matching Problems," Working Paper Series rwp19-016, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    28. Morimitsu Kurino, 2014. "House Allocation with Overlapping Generations," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 258-289, February.
    29. Carlsson, Sissa & Thomsen, Stephan L., 2015. "Improving the Allocation of Spots in Child Care Facilities for Toddlers in Germany: A Mechanism Design Approach," IZA Discussion Papers 8976, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    30. Th`anh Nguyen & Alexander Teytelboym & Shai Vardi, 2023. "Dynamic Combinatorial Assignment," Papers 2303.13967, arXiv.org.

  2. Daniel Monte & Maher Said, 2014. "The value of (bounded) memory in a changing world," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(1), pages 59-82, May.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Monte, Daniel, 2014. "Learning with bounded memory in games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 204-223.

    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Monte & Maher Said, 2014. "The value of (bounded) memory in a changing world," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(1), pages 59-82, May.
    2. Brocas, Isabelle & Carrillo, Juan D., 2016. "A neuroeconomic theory of memory retrieval," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 198-205.

  4. Monte, Daniel, 2013. "Bounded memory and permanent reputations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 345-354.

    Cited by:

    1. Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky, 2012. "Cycles of Distrust: An Economic Model," NBER Working Papers 18257, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Sperisen, Benjamin, 2018. "Bounded memory and incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 382-400.
    3. Schumacher, Heiner, 2014. "Incentives through consumer learning about tastes," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 170-177.
    4. Heski Bar-Isaac & Joyee Deb, 2012. "Reputation for a Servant of Two Masters," Working Papers 12-08, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    5. Monte, Daniel, 2014. "Learning with bounded memory in games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 204-223.
    6. Benjamin Sperisen, 2016. "Bounded Memory, Reputation, and Impatience," Working Papers 1602, Tulane University, Department of Economics.
    7. Heski Bar-Isaac Jr. & Joyee Deb Jr., 2014. "(Good and Bad) Reputation for a Servant of Two Masters," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 293-325, November.

  5. Monte, Daniel & Tumennasan, Norovsambuu, 2013. "Matching with quorums," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(1), pages 14-17.
    See citations under working paper version above.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 8 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (4) 2011-05-30 2012-05-22 2012-05-22 2013-04-27
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (3) 2012-05-22 2017-12-03 2018-12-17
  3. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (2) 2017-12-03 2018-12-17
  4. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (1) 2020-03-16
  5. NEP-DGE: Dynamic General Equilibrium (1) 2011-05-30
  6. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (1) 2018-12-17
  7. NEP-LMA: Labor Markets - Supply, Demand, and Wages (1) 2020-03-16
  8. NEP-MKT: Marketing (1) 2017-12-03
  9. NEP-ORE: Operations Research (1) 2010-07-24
  10. NEP-PPM: Project, Program and Portfolio Management (1) 2012-05-22

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