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Using Sentence Enhancements to Distinguish between Deterrence and Incapacitation

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Author Info
Kessler, Daniel P
Levitt, Steven D

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Abstract

Differentiating empirically between deterrence and incapacitation is difficult since both are a function of expected punishment. In this article we demonstrate that the introduction of sentence enhancements provides a direct means of measuring deterrence. Because the criminal would have been sentenced to prison even without the law change, there is no additional incapacitation effect from the sentence enhancement in the short run. Therefore, any immediate decrease in crime must be due to deterrence. We test the model using California's Proposition 8, which imposed sentence enhancements for a selected group of crimes. Proposition 8 appears to reduce eligible crimes by 4 percent in the year following its passage and 8 percent 3 years after passage. These immediate effects are consistent with deterrence. The impact of the law continues to increase 5-7 years after its passage, suggesting that incapacitation may be important as well. Copyright 1999 by the University of Chicago.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Law & Economics.

Volume (Year): 42 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 343-63
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:42:y:1999:i:1:p:343-63

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1984. "The optimal use of fines and imprisonment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 89-99, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Daniel P. Kessler & Anne Morrison Piehl, 1997. "The Role of Discretion in the Criminal Justice System," NBER Working Papers 6261, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Lott, John R, Jr, 1987. "Should the Wealthy Be Able to "Buy Justice"?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(6), pages 1307-16, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1997. "On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence," NBER Working Papers 6259, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. McCormick, Robert E & Tollison, Robert D, 1984. "Crime on the Court," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(2), pages 223-35, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 1994. "Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(3), pages 583-606, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Ehrlich, Isaac, 1996. "Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 43-67, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Ehrlich, Isaac, 1973. "Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(3), pages 521-65, May-June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Cameron, Samuel, 1988. "The Economics of Crime Deterrence: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(2), pages 301-23.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Steven D. Levitt, 2004. "Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors That Explain the Decline and Six That Do Not," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 163-190, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Francesco Drago & Roberto Galbiati & Pietro Vertova, 2007. "The Deterrent Effects of Prison: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 2912, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. M. Keith Chen & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2003. "Does Prison Harden Inmates? A Discontinuity-based Approach," Law and Economics 0304003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Johannes Rincke & Christian Traxler, 2009. "Deterrence through Word of Mouth," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. David Bjerk, 2004. "Youth Criminal Participation and Household Economic Status," Department of Economics Working Papers 2004-10, McMaster University. [Downloadable!]
  6. Maurin, Eric & Ouss, Aurelie, 2009. "Sentence Reductions and Recidivism: Lessons from the Bastille Day Quasi Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 3990, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  7. Avner Bar-Ilan & Bruce Sacerdote, 2001. "The Response to Fines and Probability of Detection in a Series of Experiments," NBER Working Papers 8638, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Ann Dryden Witte & Robert Witt, 2001. "What We Spend and What We Get: Public and Private Provision of Crime Prevention," NBER Working Papers 8204, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Marco Manacorda, 2008. "The Cost of Grade Retention," CEP Discussion Papers dp0878, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  10. Matthew Baker & Niklas J. Westelius, 2009. "Crime, Expectations and The Deterrence Hypothesis," Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers 425, Hunter College: Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. J.J. Prescott & Jonah E. Rockoff, 2008. "Do Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws Affect Criminal Behavior?," NBER Working Papers 13803, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Levitt Steven & Mauricio Rubio, 2000. "Understanding Crime in Colombia and What Can Be Done About It," WORKING PAPERS SERIES. DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO 003735, FEDESARROLLO. [Downloadable!]
  13. Alfredo Burlando & Alberto Motta, 2007. "Self Reporting reduces corruption in law enforcement," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0063, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno". [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Steven Levitt, 2002. "Testing the Economic Model of Crime:The National Hockey League's Two-Referee Experiment," Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 1(1), pages 1014-1014. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Gerlinde Fellner & Rupert Sausgruber & Christian Traxler, 2009. "Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Legal Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009_31, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Anna Bonanno, 2006. "The economic analysis of offender’s choice: Old and new insights," International Review of Economics, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 193-224, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Thomas J. Miceli, 2008. "Deterrence, Incapacitation, and Repeat Offenders," Working papers 2008-44, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  18. Rafael Di Tella & Ernesto Schargrodsky, 2004. "Do Police Reduce Crime? Estimates Using the Allocation of Police Forces After a Terrorist Attack," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 115-133, March. [Downloadable!]
  19. David S. Lee & Justin McCrary, 2005. "Crime, Punishment, and Myopia," NBER Working Papers 11491, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Gordon Dahl & Stefano DellaVigna, 2007. "Does Movie Violence Increase Violent Crime?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001778, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  21. Angela K. Dills & Jeffrey A. Miron & Garrett Summers, 2008. "What Do Economists Know About Crime?," NBER Working Papers 13759, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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