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Raising Children to Work Hard: Altruism, Work Norms, and Social Insurance

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Author Info
Assar Lindbeck
Sten Nyberg

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Abstract

Empirically, disincentive effects on work of generous welfare state arrangements tend to appear with a substantial time lag. One explanation is that norms concerning work and benefit dependency delay such effects. We model altruistic parents' economic incentives for instilling such work norms in their children. Anticipated economic support from parents may reduce work effort, and parental altruism makes threats to withdraw such support noncredible. Instilling norms mitigates this problem. However, generous social insurance arrangements tend to weaken parents' incentives to instill such norms in their children. We find empirical support for this prediction. Copyright by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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File URL: http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/qjec.121.4.1473
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Article provided by MIT Press in its journal The Quarterly Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 121 (2006)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 1473-1503
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Handle: RePEc:tpr:qjecon:v:121:y:2006:i:4:p:1473-1503

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  2. Bernheim, B Douglas & Shleifer, Andrei & Summers, Lawrence H, 1985. "The Strategic Bequest Motive," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1045-76, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Lindbeck, Assar & Weibull, Jorgen W, 1988. "Altruism and Time Consistency: The Economics of Fait Accompli," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(6), pages 1165-82, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "A Theory of Social Interactions," NBER Working Papers 0042, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Lindbeck, Assar, 1995. " Welfare State Disincentives with Endogenous Habits and Norms," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 97(4), pages 477-94, December.
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  6. Esther Hauk & Maria Sáez, 1999. "On the Cultural Transmission of Corruption," Economics Working Papers 392, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Becker, Gary S, 1993. "Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(3), pages 385-409, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Bisin, Alberto & Verdier, Thierry, 1998. "On the cultural transmission of preferences for social status," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 75-97, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Vega-Redondo Fernando, 1993. "Competition and Culture in an Evolutionary Process of Equilibrium Selection: A Simple Example," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 618-631, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Kandori, Michihiro, 1992. "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(1), pages 63-80, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Bruce, Neil & Waldman, Michael, 1990. "The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(1), pages 155-65, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. repec:att:wimass:199323 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg & Jšrgen W. Weibull, 1999. "Social Norms And Economic Incentives In The Welfare State," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(1), pages 1-35, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Lindbeck, Assar & Weibull, Jorgen W, 1986. " Intergenerational Aspects of Public Transfers, Borrowing and Debt," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 88(1), pages 239-67.
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  1. Steffen J. Roth, 2003. "Arbeitsmarktinstrumente und gesellschaftliche Normen - Das Mainzer-Modell untergräbt gesellschaftliche Normen und verschärft damit die Probleme, die es zu überwinden glaubt," Otto-Wolff-Institut Discussion Paper Series 01/2003, Otto-Wolff-Institut für Wirtschaftsordnung, Köln, Deutschland. [Downloadable!]
  2. Lindbeck, Assar & Nyberg, Sten & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2002. "Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics," Working Paper Series 585, Research Institute of Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Lindbeck, Assar, 2008. "Prospects for the Welfare State," Seminar Papers 755, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies. [Downloadable!]
  4. Guido Tabellini, 2007. "The Scope of Cooperation: Norms and Incentives," Levine's Working Paper Archive 321307000000000866, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Persson, Mats & Sandmo, Agnar, 2002. "Taxation and Tournaments," Seminar Papers 715, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies. [Downloadable!]
  6. Heinemann, Friedrich, 2007. "Is the Welfare State Self-destructive? A Study of Government Benefit Morale," ZEW Discussion Papers 07-029, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Lindbeck, Assar, 2003. "An Essay on Welfare State Dynamics," Seminar Papers 719, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2006. "Altruism and Climate," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 643, Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Matthias Doepke & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2007. "Occupational Choice and the Spirit of Capitalism," IZA Discussion Papers 2949, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Guido Tabellini, 2008. "The Scope of Cooperation: Values and Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  11. Cardoso, Ana Rute & Fontainha, Elsa & Monfardini, Chiara, 2008. "Children and Parents Time Use: Empirical Evidence on Investment in Human Capital in France, Italy and Germany," IZA Discussion Papers 3815, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  12. Lindbeck, Assar, 2008. "Prospects for the Welfare State," Working Paper Series 731, Research Institute of Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. Gradstein, Mark, 2008. "Endogenous Reversals of Fortune," IZA Discussion Papers 3469, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  14. Tabellini, Guido, 2007. "The Scope of Cooperation: Values and incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 6534, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Lindbeck, Assar, 2002. "The European Social Model: Lessons for Developing Countries," Seminar Papers 714, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies. [Downloadable!]
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  16. Guido Tabellini, . "The Scope of Cooperation: values and incentives," Working Papers 328, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
  17. Alger, Ingela & Weibull, Jörgen, 2007. "The Fetters of the Sib: Weber Meets Darwin," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 682, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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