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Rotten Apples: An Investigation Of The Prevalence And Predictors Of Teacher Cheating Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Brian A. Jacob
Steven D. Levitt
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We develop an algorithm for detecting teacher cheating that combines information on unexpected test score fluctuations and suspicious patterns of answers for students in a classroom. Using data from the Chicago public schools, we estimate that serious cases of teacher or administrator cheating on standardized tests occur in a minimum of 4-5 percent of elementary school classrooms annually. The observed frequency of cheating appears to respond strongly to relatively minor changes in incentives. Our results highlight the fact that high-powered incentive systems, especially those with bright line rules, may induce unexpected behavioral distortions such as cheating. Statistical analysis, however, may provide a means of detecting illicit acts, despite the best attempts of perpetrators to keep them clandestine. © 2001 the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Article provided by MIT Press in its journal The Quarterly Journal of Economics .
Volume (Year): 118 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 843-877
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Handle: RePEc:tpr:qjecon:v:118:y:2003:i:3:p:843-877Contact details of provider: Web page: http://mitpress.mit.edu/journals/
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Porter, Robert H & Zona, J Douglas, 1993.
"Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(3), pages 518-38, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Brian A. Jacob & Lars Lefgren, 2002.
"Remedial Education and Student Achievement: A Regression-Discontinuity Analysis ,"
NBER Working Papers
8918, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Brian A. Jacob & Lars Lefgren, 2002.
"The Impact of Teacher Training on Student Achievement: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from School Reform Efforts in Chicago ,"
NBER Working Papers
8916, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Richards, Craig E. & Sheu, Tian Ming, 1992.
"The South Carolina school incentive reward program: A policy analysis ,"
Economics of Education Review ,
Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 71-86, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ladd, Helen F., 1999.
"The Dallas school accountability and incentive program: an evaluation of its impacts on student outcomes ,"
Economics of Education Review ,
Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-16, February.
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Other versions: Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991.
"Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design ,"
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization ,
Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
Mark Duggan & Steven D. Levitt, 2000.
"Winning Isn't Everything: Corruption in Sumo Wrestling ,"
NBER Working Papers
7798, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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