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Signaling in Credit Markets

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Author Info
Milde, Hellmuth
Riley, John G

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Abstract

In this paper, the authors show that, under a variety of alternative assumptions about the private informati on of loan applicants, a competitive market for loans is characterize d by screening. Banks separate out loan risks by offering higher loan s at higher interest rates. Depending on the nature of the informatio nal asymmetry, it may be that applicants with less risky projects sel ect larger rather than smaller loans. Comparative statics implication s are also examined. In particular, the authors explore the effects o f an increase in banks' cost of funds on average loan quality. Copyright 1988, the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by MIT Press in its journal Quarterly Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 103 (1988)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 101-29
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Handle: RePEc:tpr:qjecon:v:103:y:1988:i:1:p:101-29

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Jaffee, Dwight M, 1972. "A Theory and Test of Credit Rationing: Further Notes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(3), pages 484-88, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Besanko, David & Thakor, Anjan V, 1987. "Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(3), pages 671-89, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Hajime Miyazaki, 1977. "The Rat Race and Internal Labor Markets," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(2), pages 394-418, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Riley, John G., 1975. "Competitive signalling," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 174-186, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
  6. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Chan, Yuk-Shee & Kanatas, George, 1985. "Asymmetric Valuations and the Role of Collateral in Loan Agreements," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 17(1), pages 84-95, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Bester, Helmut, 1985. "Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 850-55, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Song Han, 2002. "On the economics of discrimination in credit markets," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2002-2, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  2. Gary-Bobo, Robert & Larribeau, Sophie, 2002. "A Structural Econometric Model of Price Discrimination in the Mortgage Lending Industry," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Blackman, Allen, 2001. "Why Don't Lenders Finance High-Return Technological Change in Developing-Country Agriculture?," Discussion Papers dp-01-17, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Jessica Holmes & Jonathan Isham & Jessica Wasilewski, 2004. "Overcoming Information Asymmetries in Low-Income Lending: Lessons from the 'Working Wheels' Program," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0244r, Middlebury College, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. C. Mónica Capra & Matilde Fernández & Irene Ramírez-Comeig, 2005. "Moral Hazard and Collateral as Screening Device: Empirical and Experimental Evidence," Emory Economics 0505, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta). [Downloadable!]
  6. Li Gan & Roberto Mosquera, 2008. "An Empirical Study of the Credit Market with Unobserved Consumer Typers," NBER Working Papers 13873, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Ana Hidalgo-Cabrillana, 2004. "Does Asymmetric Information Promote Talented People?," Economics Working Papers we042809, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
  8. Harry Flam & Robert W. Staiger, 1989. "Adverse Selection in Credit Markets and Infant Industry Protection," NBER Working Papers 2864, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Andrew K. Rose & Mark M. Spiegel, 2008. "Non-Economic Engagement and International Exchange: The Case of Environmental Treaties," NBER Working Papers 13988, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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