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Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Fudenberg, Drew
Levine, David K
Tirole, Jean
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Article provided by MIT Press in its journal Quarterly Journal of Economics .
Volume (Year): 102 (1987)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 37-50
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Handle: RePEc:tpr:qjecon:v:102:y:1987:i:1:p:37-50Contact details of provider: Web page: http://mitpress.mit.edu/journals/
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Drew Fudenberg & David Levine & Jean Tirole, 1985.
"Sequential Bargaining with Many Buyers ,"
Working papers
366, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1984.
"Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1351-64, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bulow, Jeremy I, 1982.
"Durable-Goods Monopolists ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(2), pages 314-32, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Coase, Ronald H, 1972.
"Durability and Monopoly ,"
Journal of Law & Economics ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 143-49, April.
Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986.
"The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Gul, Faruk & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Wilson, Robert, 1986.
"Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 155-190, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Jean Tirole, 1985.
"Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information ,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
1098, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1983.
"Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(2), pages 221-47, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Riley, John & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1983.
"Optimal Selling Strategies: When to Haggle, When to Hold Firm ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 98(2), pages 267-89, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982.
"Sequential Equilibria ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Paul Schweinzer, 2006.
"Sequential bargaining with pure common values ,"
Discussion Papers
137, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
[Downloadable!]
Roman Inderst, 2008.
"Dynamic Bilateral Bargaining under Private Information with a Sequence of Potential Buyers ,"
Review of Economic Dynamics ,
Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(1), pages 220-236, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Randolph Sloof, 2003.
"Price-setting Power versus Private Information ,"
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
03-099/1, Tinbergen Institute.
[Downloadable!]
Chatterjee, Kalyan & Dutta, Bhaskar, 2006.
"Markets with Bilateral Bargaining and Incomplete Information ,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
762, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 1998.
"Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation - (Now published in Econometrica, 69(4) (March 2001), pp. 377-411.) ,"
STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series
361, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
[Downloadable!]
Gilles Chemla & Antoine Faure Grimaud, 1996.
"Dynamic Adverse Selection and Debt ,"
Economics Working Papers
196, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Dec 1996.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Chemla, G. & Faure-Grimaud, A., 1996.
"Dynamic Adverse Selection and Debt ,"
Papers
96.443, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
Chemla, Gilles & Faure-Grimaud, Antoine, 1998.
"Dynamic Adverse Selection and Debt ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2037, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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