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On The Robustness of Majority Rule

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Author Info
Partha Dasgupta
Eric Maskin

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Abstract

We show that simple majority rule satisfies five standard and attractive axioms-the Pareto property, anonymity, neutrality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and (generic) decisiveness-over a larger class of preference domains than (essentially) any other voting rule. Hence, in this sense, it is the most robust voting rule. This characterization of majority rule provides an alternative to that of May (1952). (JEL: D71) (c) 2008 by the European Economic Association.

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File URL: http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/JEEA.2008.6.5.949
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Publisher Info
Article provided by MIT Press in its journal Journal of the European Economic Association.

Volume (Year): 6 (2008)
Issue (Month): 5 (09)
Pages: 949-973
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Handle: RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:6:y:2008:i:5:p:949-973

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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This page was last updated on 2008-12-19.

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