Tamás Solymosi () (Department of Operations Research, Budapest University of Economic Sciences and Public Administration, 1828 Budapest, Pf. 489, Hungary, phone: +36-1-456 6757, fax: +36-1-456 6435, e-mail: tamas.solymosi@opkut.bke.hu)
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
It is well known that in three-person transferable-utility cooperative games the bargaining set {\cal M}i1 and the core coincide for any coalition structure, provided the latter solution is not empty. In contrast, five-person totally-balanced games are discussed in the literature in which the bargaining set {\cal M}i1 (for the grand coalition) is larger then the core. This paper answers the equivalence question in the remaining four-person case. We prove that in any four-person game and for arbitrary coalition structure, whenever the core is not empty, it coincides with the bargaining set {\cal M}i1. Our discussion employs a generalization of balancedness to games with coalition structures.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.