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A theory of rent seeking with informational foundations

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Author Info
Johan Lagerlöf ()

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10101-006-0026-8
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Economics of Governance.

Volume (Year): 8 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Pages: 197-218
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Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:8:y:2007:i:3:p:197-218

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Related research
Keywords: Rent seeking; Competition; Lobbying; Information acquisition; Disclosure; Welfare; D42; D43; D72; D83; L13;

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  1. Tullock, Gordon, 1975. "On the Efficient Organization of Trials," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 28(4), pages 745-62.
  2. Lagerlof, Johan N.M. & Heidhues, Paul, 2005. "On the desirability of an efficiency defense in merger control," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(9-10), pages 803-827, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Lars Frisell & Johan N. M. Lagerlöf, 2007. "A Model of Reputation in Cheap Talk," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 109(1), pages 49-70, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 807-27, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(4), pages 1089-127, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Paul R. Milgrom & John Roberts, 1985. "Relying on the Information of Interested Parties," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 749, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Lohmann, Susanne, 1994. "Information Aggregation through Costly Political Action," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 518-30, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Morten Bennedsen & Sven E. Feldmann, 2002. "Lobbying Legislatures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(4), pages 919-948, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Potters, Jan & van Winden, Frans, 1992. " Lobbying and Asymmetric Information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 269-92, October.
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