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Coordinating on Lower Prices: Pharmaceutical Pricing under Political Pressure

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Author Info
Sara Fisher Ellison () (MIT)
Catherine Wolfram () (UC Berkeley)
Abstract

We investigate the effects of political activity on pharmaceutical prices, focusing on the health care reform period in the early 1990s.We characterize firms based on their vulnerability to future price regulation and find that the more vulnerable firms were more likely to take various actions to forestall regulation, most notably coordinating on a specific percentage price increase during 1993. Since moderating price increases could have averted regulation, the coordination appears to be the industry's response to a collective action problem. Ordering information: This article can be ordered from http://gemini.econ.umd.edu/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi?action=buy&year=2006&issue=sum&page=324&tid=30492&sc=1869P1N9.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 37 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
Pages: 324-340
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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:37:y:2006:2:p:324-340

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  1. Glenn Ellison & Sara Fisher Ellison, 2007. "Strategic Entry Deterrence and the Behavior of Pharmaceutical Incumbents Prior to Patent Expiration," NBER Working Papers 13069, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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