This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
Political Constraints on Executive Compensation: Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Paul L. Joskow
Nancy L. Rose
Catherine Wolfram
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
This study explores the effect of regulatory and political constraints on the level of CEO compensation for 87 state-regulated electric utilities during 1978-1990. The results suggest that political pressures may constrain top executive pay levels in this industry. First, CEOs of firms operating in regulatory environments characterized by investment banks as relatively "proconsumer" receive lower compensation than do CEOs of firms in environments ranked as more friendly to investors. Second, CEO pay is lower for utilities with relatively high or rising rates, or a higher proportion of industrial customers. Finally, attributes of the commission appointment and tenure rules affect CEO compensation in ways consistent with the political constraint hypothesis.
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page . Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics .
Volume (Year): 27 (1996)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
Pages: 165-182
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract ),
plain text
(with abstract ),
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:27:y:1996:i:spring:p:165-182Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.rje.org
Order Information: Web: http://gemini.econ.umd.edu/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().
Keywords: Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Murphy, Kevin J., 1985.
"Corporate performance and managerial remuneration : An empirical analysis ,"
Journal of Accounting and Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 7(1-3), pages 11-42, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Haubrich, Joseph G, 1994.
"Risk Aversion, Performance Pay, and the Principal-Agent Problem ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(2), pages 258-76, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Peter Navarro, 1982.
"Public Utility Commission Regulation: Performance, Determinants, and Energy Policy Impacts ,"
The Energy Journal ,
International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 3(2), pages 119-140.
Joskow, Paul L. & Rose, Nancy L. & Shepard, Andrea., 1993.
"Regulatory constraints on executive compensation ,"
Working papers
3550-93., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
[Downloadable!]
Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1990.
"Relative performance evaluation for chief executive officers ,"
Industrial and Labor Relations Review ,
ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University, vol. 43(3), pages 30-51, February.
Smiley, Robert H. & Greene, William H., 1983.
"Determinants of the effectiveness of electric utility regulation ,"
Resources and Energy ,
Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 65-81, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Noll, Roger G., 1989.
"Economic perspectives on the politics of regulation ,"
Handbook of Industrial Organization ,
in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 22, pages 1253-1287
Elsevier.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
George J. Stigler, 1971.
"The Theory of Economic Regulation ,"
Bell Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990.
"Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-64, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Robert L. Hagerman & Brian T. Ratchford, 1978.
"Some Determinants of Allowed Rates of Return on Equity to Electric Utilities ,"
Bell Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(1), pages 46-55, Spring.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Sloan, Richard G., 1993.
"Accounting earnings and top executive compensation ,"
Journal of Accounting and Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 16(1-3), pages 55-100, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Cuñat, Vicente & Guadalupe, Maria, 2004.
"Executive Compensation and Competition in the Banking and Financial Sectors ,"
IZA Discussion Papers
1123, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Cuñat, Vicente & Guadalupe, Maria, 2004.
"Executive Compensation and Competition in the Banking and Financial Sectors ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4425, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Vicente Cuñat & Maria Guadalupe, 2007.
"Executive Compensation and Competition in the Banking and Financial Sectors ,"
FMG Discussion Papers
dp598, Financial Markets Group.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Cuñat, Vicente & Guadalupe, Maria, 2009.
"Executive compensation and competition in the banking and financial sectors ,"
Journal of Banking & Finance ,
Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 495-504, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Nancy L. Rose & Catherine Wolfram, 2000.
"Has the "Million-Dollar Cap" Affected CEO Pay? ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 197-202, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Shane M. Greenstein & Pablo T. Spiller, 1996.
"Estimating the Welfare Effects of Digital Infrastructure ,"
NBER Working Papers
5770, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Johnson, Marilyn F. & Nelson, Karen K. & Shackell, Margaret B., 2001.
"An Empirical Analysis of the SEC's 1992 Proxy Reforms on Executive Compensation ,"
Research Papers
1679, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
[Downloadable!]
Christian Bayer & Carsten Burhop, 2008.
"Corporate Governance and Incentive Contracts: Historical Evidence from a Legal Reform ,"
Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
2008_11, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Robert Michaels, 2008.
"Electricity Market Monitoring and the Economics of Regulation ,"
Review of Industrial Organization ,
Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 197-216, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Christian Bayer & Carsten Burhop, 2004.
"A Corporate Governance Reform as a Natural Experiment for Incentive Contracts ,"
Finance
0407002, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Nancy L. Rose & Catherine Wolfram, 2000.
"Regulating Executive Pay: Using the Tax Code to Influence CEO Compensation ,"
NBER Working Papers
7842, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Eva Jansson, 0.
"Deregulation, property rights, and legal system ,"
European Journal of Law and Economics ,
Springer, vol. 0, pages 1-25.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Simon Grant & Stephen King & Ben Polak, 1995.
"Information Externalities, Share-Price Based Incentives and Managerial Behaviour ,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1107, Cowles Foundation, Yale University.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Grant, Simon & King, Stephen & Polak, Ben, 1996.
" Information Externalities, Share-Price Based Incentives and Managerial Behaviour ,"
Journal of Economic Surveys ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 10(1), pages 1-21, March.
Access and
download statistics Did you know? Citation analysis on IDEAS includes online papers that are freely accessible and whose text could be automatically analyzed, currently about 210000 papers.
This page was last updated on 2009-11-13.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .