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Quality and Quantity Competition

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Author Info
Esther Gal-Or

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Abstract

This article develops an oligopoly model where both prices and quality levels are determined at the equilibrium. Multiple symmetric equilibria arise when the distribution of consumers according to their willingness to pay is not uniform and more than one firm participates in the market. With a uniform distribution, we demonstrate that the impact of entry is to reduce average quality and to increase aggregate output. The implications for social welfare are ambiguous.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal Bell Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 14 (1983)
Issue (Month): 2 (Autumn)
Pages: 590-600
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Handle: RePEc:rje:bellje:v:14:y:1983:i:autumn:p:590-600

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  1. Luigi Filippini, 1999. "Leapfrogging in a Vertical Product Differentiation Model," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 6(2), pages 245-256, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2000. "Entry and Vertical Differentiation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1277, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. David P. Myatt & Justin P. Johnson, 2002. "Multiproduct Quality Competition: Fighting Brands and Product Line Pruning," Economics Series Working Papers 105, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Rasha Ahmed & Kathleen Segerson, 2007. "Emissions Control and the Regulation of Product Markets: The Case of Automobiles," Working papers 2007-40, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Rasha Ahmed & Kathleen Segerson, 2006. "Collective Voluntary Agreements and the Production of Less Polluting Products," Working papers 2006-18, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised May 2007. [Downloadable!]
  6. Bonroy, Olivier, 2003. "Le standard de qualité minimale est-il un instrument socialement optimal? Une revue de littérature," Cahiers de recherche 0304, GREEN. [Downloadable!]
  7. repec:pit:wpaper:243 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 1999. "Entry and Innovation in Vertically Differentiated Markets," Discussion Papers 1260, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Bing Jing, 2004. "Monotone Profitability Ranking in a Differentiated Oligopoly," Working Papers 04-28, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Mark Frascatore, 2002. "On Vertical Differentiation Under Bertrand and Cournot: When Input Quality has Upward Sloping Supply," Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 2(1), pages 1002-1002. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Panu Poutvaara & Andreas Wagener, 2004. "The Invisible Hand Plays Dice: Eventualities in Religious Markets," Others 0406005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Gerhard Orosel & Klaus G. Zauner, 2004. "Vertical Product Differentiation When Quality is Unobservable to Buyers," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  13. David P. Myatt & Justin P. Johnson, 2005. "Multiproduct Cournot Oligopoly," Economics Series Working Papers 145, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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