In a simple search model of money, we study a special kind of memory which gives rise to an arrangement resembling a payment network. Specifically, we assume that agents can pay a cost to have access to a central data base which keeps track of payments made and received. Incentives must be provided to agents to access the central data base and to produce when they have access to this arrangement. We also study policies that can loosen these incentive constraints. In particular, we show that a `no-surcharge' rule has good incentive properties. Finally, we compare our model with the model of Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999 a and b). (Copyright: Elsevier)
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Article provided by Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics in its journal Review of Economic Dynamics.
Volume (Year): 11 (2008) Issue (Month): 1 (January) Pages: 104-132 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML,
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Find related papers by JEL classification: E59 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Other G29 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Other L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
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Ping He & Lixin Huang & Randall Wright, 2005.
"Money And Banking In Search Equilibrium,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(2), pages 637-670, 05.
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Charles M. Kahn & William Roberds, 2005.
"Credit and identity theft,"
Working Paper
2005-19, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
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