This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Bribery and Public Debt Repudiation

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
 Di Gioacchino, Debora
Ginebri, Sergio
Sabani, Laura

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In cases where policy makers accept "bribes" offered by organised lobbies or interested parties, government decisions can be modelled as a first price menu auction. In this paper we adapt this structure to model debt repudiation. We consider a one-period model in which two generations, parents and children, are present, and debt titles are unevenly distributed among parents. The government can repay the debt by a combination of taxes on the children's income and on the outstanding debt. We exclude intergenerational conflicts, assuming that the parents' and children's objective is to maximise the utility of the family. In this perspective, families make offers that relate monetary contributions to the tax structures chosen by the government. On the hypothesis that all interests are represented, we obtain the result that the government is indifferent to the tax structure. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0048-5829/contents
File Format: text/html
File Function: link to full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 105 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (December)
Pages: 303-21
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:105:y:2000:i:3-4:p:303-21

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Victor Vaugirard, 2005. "Crony Capitalism and Sovereign Default," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 77-99, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Di Gioacchino, Debora & Ginebri, Sergio & Sabani, Laura, 2004. "Political support to public debt repudiation in a Monetary Union - the role of the geographical allocation of debt," Economics & Statistics Discussion Papers esdp04019, University of Molise, Dept. SEGeS. [Downloadable!]
  3. Di Gioacchino, Debora & Ginebri, Sergio & Sabani, Laura, 2003. "The Political Power of the Owners of Public Debt," Economics & Statistics Discussion Papers esdp03006, University of Molise, Dept. SEGeS. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Over five million full texts a year are downloaded through IDEAS.

This page was last updated on 2009-10-24.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.