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Does Increased Equity Ownership Lead to More Strategically Involved Boards?

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Author Info
Sayan Chatterjee ()
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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10551-008-9797-x
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Business Ethics.

Volume (Year): 87 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 267-277
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Handle: RePEc:kap:jbuset:v:87:y:2009:i:1:p:267-277

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100281

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Related research
Keywords: acquisitions; board composition; board vigilance; corporate governance; equity holding; hostile takeover;

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Weisbach, Michael S., 1988. "Outside directors and CEO turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 431-460, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Byrd, John W. & Hickman, Kent A., 1992. "Do outside directors monitor managers? *1: Evidence from tender offer bids," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 195-221, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 1991. "The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 20(4), Winter.
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  5. Keasey, Kevin & Moon, Philip, 2000. "Sunk cost effects: a test of the importance of context," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 55-58, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Cotter, James F. & Shivdasani, Anil & Zenner, Marc, 1997. "Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 195-218, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2003. "Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: a survey of the economic literature," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Apr, pages 7-26. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-7.


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