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Does Increased Equity Ownership Lead to More Strategically Involved Boards? Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Sayan Chatterjee ()
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Business Ethics .
Volume (Year): 87 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 267-277
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Handle: RePEc:kap:jbuset:v:87:y:2009:i:1:p:267-277Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100281
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Keywords: acquisitions ; board composition ; board vigilance ; corporate governance ; equity holding ; hostile takeover ; References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Byrd, John W. & Hickman, Kent A., 1992.
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Journal of Financial Economics ,
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Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988.
"Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis ,"
Journal of Financial Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January.
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Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 1991.
"The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance ,"
Financial Management ,
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Other versions: Keasey, Kevin & Moon, Philip, 2000.
"Sunk cost effects: a test of the importance of context ,"
Economics Letters ,
Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 55-58, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cotter, James F. & Shivdasani, Anil & Zenner, Marc, 1997.
"Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers? ,"
Journal of Financial Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 195-218, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2003.
"Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: a survey of the economic literature ,"
Economic Policy Review ,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Apr, pages 7-26.
[Downloadable!]
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